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 4 
Introduction 
The 2008 global financial crisis presented scholars with a dramatic 
demonstration of the extent of global integration of the financial markets and the 
ramifications of this integration for a range of actors in the international system. 
States, traditionally viewed as the central players in global governance, scrambled to 
develop adequate domestic policy responses to mitigate the impact of the crisis on the 
real economy. A globally coordinated policy response by state actors was discussed, 
yet ultimately proved unachievable as policy makers came under domestic political 
pressure to act unilaterally. A number of states were able to pursue similar approaches 
in responding to the crisis, but the scale of the crisis and the speed of its impact across 
various markets prevented a fully coordinated policy response. While the global 
nature of the 2008 global financial crisis was not new, the pivotal role credit rating 
agencies played both before and after the crisis was. The tumultuous events that 
engulfed the financial system during 2008 raised serious questions about the rating 
agencies and triggered tough regulatory responses from state actors in a number of 
markets, most notably Europe.  
For International Political Economy (IPE) scholars, this crisis raised a number 
of questions regarding the contemporary international system and those actors who 
influence global governance. While much of the focus has been on how state actors 
can improve their ability to coordinate their response to challenges whose origins and 
solutions lie well beyond their jurisdictional responsibility, the role of credit rating 
agencies warrants greater analysis. These agencies have the important role of rating a 
range of financial instruments that have an immediate and material impact on the cost 
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of debt and assessments made by participants in global finance on the 
creditworthiness of range of state and non-state actors. They also provide a wide 
range of additional analysis that plays a conspicuous role in the creation of knowledge 
and the establishment of norms in the modern international system. Their impact on 
the real economy is substantial.  
Despite many policy makers introducing greater regulation and direct public 
investment in response to the 2008 financial crisis, the credit rating agencies have 
emerged in an empowered position in some markets, with government rescue 
packages formalising the role of rating agencies in the financial system. While the 
failure of the rating agencies to foresee or prevent the crisis remains unresolved, they 
remain the only actors in the modern international system with the global capacity to 
assess the creditworthiness of the massive number of entities and financial 
instruments that exist in the twenty-first century. This institutional capacity was 
developed during decades of liberalisation in the global economy. These matters 
gained increased importance following the well-documented retreat of the state from a 
range of activities, making the flow of private sector investment and the provision of 
credit the lifeblood of contemporary global governance. This transfer has left state 
actors largely impotent in their ability to accurately assess the financial strength of 
many domestic state and non-state entities.  
To observers of contemporary global governance, it is evident that most actors 
over an extended period of time either pursed a liberal approach to governance or are 
currently seeking to remove state control over economic activities.1 India and China 
                                                 
1
 Soumyen Sikdar, Contemporary Issues in Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),  
p.2.   
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provide poignant examples of the relentless global effort to remove barriers to market 
forces. The emergence of a consensus around the desirability of a liberal approach to 
governance has long been promulgated by a range of powerful international 
institutions including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the 
credit rating agencies.2 While each of these institutions has a role to play in the 
liberalisation process, the recent role of credit rating agencies such as Standard and 
Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings deserves more attention from IPE scholars.  
In the context of global governance, analysis is often delineated between the 
developed and developing world. Each is seen as having a unique set of issues, 
governance structures and challenges. The influence of the IMF and World Bank is 
typically limited to developing countries that are dependent on their assistance, with 
non-state actors generally seen as being comparatively more influential in the 
developed world. However, the credit rating agencies exert influence over an eclectic 
range of actors across both the developed and developing world. These organisations 
rate the creditworthiness and policies of states and trans-national corporations 
(TNCs), benchmarking such actors against a rigid set of criteria, while also providing 
more qualitative analysis and research. The providers of credit are heavily influenced 
by the assessments made by rating agencies, empowering their influence in the 
modern international system. This influence has increased as capital mobility has 
increased. Timothy Sinclair noted that the impacts of financial issues such as these are 
                                                 
2
 Porter provides a useful definition of an institution as being ‘a set of recognized rules that can be 
informal or formal’. Porter goes on to highlight that an institution uses a combination of specific rules 
and widely shared expectations and understandings. Tony Porter, Globalization and Finance 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p. 25.  
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profound as ‘policy and democratic life at home and in far away places are 
increasingly affected by international capital mobility’.3   
Technological improvements, burgeoning money supply and the removal of 
regulatory restrictions have liberalised the international money markets and enabled 
the providers of foreign capital to transfer investments and credit between states and 
TNCs quickly and cheaply.4 The growth in scale of the global financial system has 
increased the importance of knowledge, which plays a key role in guiding the 
activities of many actors in the modern international system. Within this emerging 
framework, the credit rating agencies advocate liberal policy settings that augment the 
free flow of credit.5 Thomas Friedman described these ratings agencies as the 
‘bloodhounds of the electronic herd’, stating that ‘they are supposed to bark loudly 
when they see a country slipping out of the golden straightjacket’.6  
The credit rating agencies have secured an integral role in steering credit and 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) through helping the providers of that capital navigate 
an increasingly complex global investment environment. As Timothy Sinclair has 
observed, ‘market actors in the new global finance are overwhelmed with news and 
data about prices, businesses and politics’ and that rating agencies ‘derive epistemic 
authority from the expert and local forms of knowledge they offer the market’.7 This 
                                                 
3
 Timothy Sinclair, 'Global Monitor: Bond Rating Agencies', New Political Economy 8 no. 1 (2003): 
147-61, p. 158.  
4
 Timothy Sinclair, 'The Infrastructure of Global Governance: Quasi-Regulatory Mechanisms and the 
New Global Finance', Global Governance 7 no. 4 (2001): 441-51, p. 446. 
5
 Ibid., p. 441. 
6
 Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (London: Harper Collins, 2000), p. 108.  
7
 Sinclair, 'The Infrastructure of Global Governance: Quasi-Regulatory Mechanisms and the New 
Global Finance', p. 443. Sinclair also discusses the concept of epistemic authority as it applies to global 
governance in his article, ‘Reinventing Authority: Embedded Knowledge Networks and the New 
Global Finance.’ Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 18 no. 4 (2000): 487 – 502: p. 
495. 
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authority derives its legitimacy through recognised knowledge within the context of 
competing theories. Such authority places agencies such as Standard and Poor’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch Ratings at the heart of decision making in global affairs, as state 
and non-state decision makers endeavour to enhance their financial reputation, obtain 
credit and attract investment support. Credit rating agencies continue to cultivate an 
expanded suite of services that create additional opportunities for the provision of 
analysis well beyond rating scores. Given their important role, a better comprehension 
of how credit rating agencies make their assessments and interact with rated entities is 
likely to provide scholars with an improved understanding of how global affairs are 
being shaped in the twenty-first century.  
As an institution, the credit rating agencies have a role, as Sinclair argues, in 
‘constraining thinking to a specific range of acceptable possibilities’ that has guided 
decision makers around the globe.8 This process has powerful ramifications for the 
modern international system. As a large, fast-growing economy that has undergone 
dramatic liberalisation, India provides scholars with poignant case study of how credit 
rating agencies influence decision making in developing economies. Indicative of the 
many public interactions between the rating agencies and Indian decision makers was 
the April 2006 decision by Standard and Poor’s to revise its outlook for India from 
‘stable’ to ‘positive’ while maintaining a BB+/B rating on the sovereign.9 According 
to Standard and Poor’s credit analyst, Ping Chew, the reason for the upgrade was 
‘improved prospects of a stabilizing debt burden based on greater effort across all 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., p. 443.  
9
 ‘Standard & Poor’s Outlook On India Revised To Positive On Improved Budgetary Prospects; 
Ratings Affirmed’, Bank Net India, accessed 04/10/06, 
http://www.banknetindia.com/banking/sp06a.htm 
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levels of governments to consolidate their fiscal positions’.10 The carrot and stick 
approach employed by the rating agencies was highlighted when Mr Chew went on to 
say:  
further liberalization of the economy and infrastructure improvements will help 
India's trend growth. Such reforms coupled with continued fiscal consolidation 
will help India achieve investment grade over time. On the other hand, if the 
fiscal consolidation stalls or the reform agenda derails, the outlook could be 
revised to stable.11  
Just one month later, Moody’s upgraded the outlook for India’s domestic currency 
rating from ‘negative’ to ‘stable’, due to a perception that there had been an 
improvement in India’s debt scenario.12 The same report by the ratings agency 
highlighted the need for Indian decision makers to create a favourable environment 
for private investment and improve fiscal flexibility.13 India’s policy elite continued to 
pursue liberalisation, in the hope of attracting more FDI. The correlation between 
assessments made by credit rating agencies and decisions made by state actors is 
strong and specific examples will be explored in greater detail in this thesis.  
The Indian case study demonstrates that contemporary global governance is 
dominated by complex interactions between various actors, including the suppliers of 
credit and FDI. Ongoing growth in money supply and shrinking public sector funding 
have increased the importance of the role of the provisioning of credit and FDI, 
leading to heightened sensitivity to the credit rating agencies’ recommendations and 
commentary. However, the 2008 financial crisis raised questions about the objectivity 
                                                 
10
 Idem.   
11
 Idem. 
12
 Moody’s, ‘Moody’s changes outlook on India’s domestic currency debt to stable from negative as 
debt ratios stabilize’, (4 May 2006), accessed 04/10/06,   http://www.moodys.com/research/MOODYS-
CHANGES-OUTLOOK-ON-INDIAS-DOMESTIC-CURRENCY-DEBT-TO-STABLE--PR_112794 
13
 Idem. 
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of these agencies, with some observers, like Aaron Lucchetti and Serena Ng from The 
Wall Street Journal, claiming that ‘rating firms had so much to gain by issuing 
investment-grade ratings that they let their guard down. They had a ‘symbiotic 
relationship’ with the banks and mortgage companies that create these products’.14  
State actors reacted to the crisis by seeking greater transparency over the credit 
rating process, with the European Union (EU) announcing in late 2008 the 
introduction of a regulation of the rating agencies to ‘restore market confidence and 
increase investor protection’.15 This regulatory response contained a number of 
punitive measures that prevented credit rating agencies from providing advisory 
services or rating financial instruments if they do not have sufficient quality 
information to base their ratings on. The regulations also required credit rating 
agencies to disclose their methodologies and assumptions, publish annual 
transparency reports, and ensure that there are at least three independent directors on 
their boards.  
These initiatives reflected a desire amongst many policy makers around the 
world to reign in the credit rating agencies amidst a perception of opaque decision 
making and potential conflicts of interest. There is also evidence available that 
suggests that non-state actors had become doubtful about the role of credit rating 
agencies. In March and April of 2008, KPMG surveyed 333 senior executives from 
the global fund and investment management community. The survey found that 86% 
                                                 
14
 Aaron Lucchetti and Serena Ng, 'How Credit Firms’ Calls Fuelled Subprime Mess', The Wall Street 
Journal, 15 August 2007, p. A1.  
15
 European Union, ‘Commission Adopts a Proposal to Regulate Credit Rating Agencies' (Brussels, 
2008), accessed 15/11/08, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1684&format=HTML&aged=0&langu
age=EN&guiLanguage=en 
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of respondents had concerns regarding conflicts of interest in respect of rating 
agencies, while 88% thought a lack of understanding of the instruments they rate was 
a concern.
16
 Furthermore, a significant 48% disagreed partially or entirely with the 
statement: ‘rating agencies provide an accurate assessment of whether an instrument 
will default’.17 At a time when technical capabilities of credit rating agencies was 
being questioned by providers of private capital, the role of credit rating agencies in 
contemporary interactions between state and non-state actors has become a critical 
juncture in the international system.  
This juncture is particularly relevant given the origins of the 2008 financial 
crisis. Leading up to the credit crunch, credit rating agencies gave positive investment 
grade ratings to securitised mortgage products that were subsequently sold and 
purchased through various financial instruments in the financial market. The World 
Bank noted that ‘because many institutional investors and even banks viewed debt 
with the same credit rating as fungible, even the most complex, innovative or opaque 
debt instrument could be sold as long as it received an investment-grade rating.’18 The 
deterioration in the value of these products and the ensuing crisis has been well 
documented, with many of these securitised mortgage products being based on low-
document mortgage loans to ‘at risk’ home purchasers in the United States. Once 
default rates increased, many of the securitised products began to unwind, leading to 
                                                 
16
 KPMG, Beyond the Credit Crisis: The Impact and Lessons Learned for Fund Mangers (UK: KPMG 
Europe LLP, 2008): 1-36, p. 21, accessed 2/7/08, 
http://www.kpmg.de/docs/Beyond_the_credit_crisis.pdf 
17
 Idem.  
18
 Jonathan Katz, Emanuel Salinas and Constantinos Stephanou, ‘Crisis Response: Credit Rating 
Agencies, No Easy Regulatory Solutions’, Viewpoint Policy Journal, Washington D.C.: The World 
Bank Group, no. 8, October (2009): 1-8, p. 3. 
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massive losses by a number of banks, other lending institutions and hedge funds, 
triggering the 2008 global financial crisis.  
It is well recognised that credit rating agencies inaccurately assessed the health 
of a range of financial products, bringing into question both their ability to carry out 
their stated role and their objectivity, particularly given the evidence that the agencies 
themselves secured a growing percentage of their income through rating securitised 
products. The World Bank identified that: 
lower transparency and greater complexity in this market ensured a heavy 
reliance by market participants on rating agencies. Partly as a result, the 
global market for non-traditional debt offerings grew enormously in a short 
period, dramatically increasing the revenue stream and profitability of rating 
agencies.
19
  
The World Bank also observed that rating structured products was more profitable 
than rating corporate bonds, with fees earned for rating corporate debt issues typically 
between three to four basis points, whereas the fees for structured finance issues can 
exceed ten basis points. By 2006, structured finance accounted for 54% of the rating 
business revenues for Moody’s.20  
The 2008 global financial crisis triggered a re-evaluation of the role of credit 
rating agencies in the modern international system. This is a role that continues to 
evolve, as the rating agencies expand their service offering beyond simple rating 
decisions to more subjective observations. In the context of global governance in the 
twenty-first century, such issues highlight the need for scholars to gain a better 
                                                 
19
 Idem.  
20
 Idem. 
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understanding of how credit rating agencies seek to influence decision making within 
rated entities.   
In modern commentary of global governance issues, the role of the credit 
rating agencies is often implied or assumed, yet few scholars have attempted to 
analyse how they exercise influence in global affairs. One exception to this is 
Timothy Sinclair, who in his book, The New Masters of Capital (2005), provides 
much needed context for the rating agencies and the influence they exert.
21
 In order to 
compliment such research, a sophisticated analysis of how various actors in 
contemporary global governance interact with international rating agencies is 
required. Research of this nature would seek to answer questions such as: Why is 
credit and the flow of private capital so important to global governance in the twenty-
first century? What role does knowledge play in the modern international system and 
who controls knowledge generation? How have state actors altered their policies to 
placate the rating agencies? How do credit rating agencies interact with state actors 
and seek to influence their decision making? Given the growing usage of broader 
service offerings by the credit rating agencies, how do their representatives reach 
judgements about the likely future actions of decision makers? These issues will have 
a profound impact on global governance in the twenty-first century and warrant 
greater analysis by scholars of the international political economy.  
This thesis shall seek to contribute to an enhanced comprehension of the role 
of credit rating agencies in contemporary global governance by sequentially 
contextualising their prominence in the modern international system and focusing on 
                                                 
21
 Timothy Sinclair, The New Masters of Capital: The American Bond Rating Agencies and the Politics 
of Creditworthiness (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005), passim.  
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the interaction between rating agencies and state actors. To facilitate this process, 
Chapter One will explore some of the relevant theories in the current field of 
scholarship and their application to the contemporary role of credit rating agencies, 
analysed within the context of overarching governance themes. Of particular focus 
will be the emergence of credit as the lifeblood of contemporary global governance, 
which will be observed within the context of the explosive growth in the use of credit 
products by state and non-state actors, especially derivative products.  
Having reviewed much of the current literature on the subject and established 
a critical methodology for investigating the role of credit in global governance, the 
thesis will turn to the all important issue of creditworthiness. The statistics set out in 
Chapter Two will clearly illustrate how important credit has become and why 
perceptions of creditworthiness are so relevant to cotemporary human affairs. As a 
continuation of this discussion, Chapter Three will outline the pivotal role of 
knowledge in that process, as decision makers in a highly complex and interconnected 
global financial system seek to distil a burgeoning supply of information through 
globally recognised and consistent knowledge structures.  
By way of illustration, Chapters Four and Five will explore two pertinent case 
studies that demonstrate how contemporary global governance is applied in the 
modern international system. Experiences in Ireland and Hungary during 2010 
provide scholars with relevant and revealing examples of the interaction between state 
actors and credit rating agencies. Both experiences also demonstrate how credit rating 
agencies comprehend and use their influence to shape decision making by state-based 
decision makers. This focus will also clarify how the rating agencies use outlooks and 
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reviews to make predictive assessments about the future actions of state-based 
decision makers, effectively enhancing their ability to exert influence and control 
through knowledge generation and distribution. 
The complexity of the modern international system creates challenges for 
scholars seeking to interpret trends and create meaning. Scholarly theory plays a key 
role in providing structure around the observations made of a system with many 
moving parts. The scale of the global financial system and the volume of information 
available can create an opacity that prevents a clearer understanding of contemporary 
human affairs. Of particular relevance to this research are those theories that relate to 
the behaviour of actors in the international system and the allocation and expression 
of power. Those variables that influence these factors also warrant a greater 
understanding. By comparing and contrasting alternative scholarly views and 
applying relevant concepts to contemporary global governance, this thesis aims to 
enhance the understanding of the role of credit rating agencies in the modern 
international system.  
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Chapter One: Literature Review 
The aim of this literature review is to compare and contrast different authors’ 
views on contemporary global governance and the role of the credit rating agencies. It 
is also the aim of this literature review to broadly group those authors depending on 
their approaches, note areas of disagreement, highlight any gaps in current field of 
scholarship and demonstrate how this thesis relates to existing research and the 
literature in general. This literature review will provide definitional boundaries and a 
theoretical framework for my research. While there has been extensive work carried 
out by various authors on the evolution of global governance in the contemporary 
setting, much of the focus of this research has been on the shift of responsibilities 
away from sovereign governments and their international organisations towards 
market forces and multilateral organisations such as the World Bank and IMF. These 
works provide a useful background relating to the diminution of the role of the nation-
state in global governance, but the role of other actors in twenty-first century global 
governance, specifically the role of credit rating agencies, has received comparatively 
little attention.  
The definition of global governance is, in of itself, part of the contemporary 
dialogue amongst IPE scholars. While there are obvious differences between various 
actors, the significant increase in trade volumes and the growing interconnectivity of 
the world’s financial markets suggests the presence of an international system that 
governs the transfer of significant assets across borders on a daily basis. Within any 
discussion on the definition of global governance lies a cross section of views, from a 
specific set of identifiable guidelines, as favoured by the United Nations’ Commission 
 17 
for Global Governance, to definitions that acknowledge a more interpretive approach 
to a subject such as governance on a global scale.  
Much of the scholarship recently conducted in the field of global governance 
has been guided by the work of James Rosenau, who has published several books on 
the subject, including Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World 
Politics (1992)— a volume of essays that he co-edited with Ernst-Otto Czempiel.22 In 
one of two contributing essays, entitled, ‘Governance, Order, and Change in World 
Politics’, Rosenau’s analysis is shaped by the notion that global governance is a 
‘biosphere’ that is part of ‘an organic whole’.23 The use of such terms suggests a much 
more elastic interpretation of power flows in the contemporary order. Indeed, Rosenau 
dismisses the concept that there is one overarching trend in global governance, but 
rather argues that there are several contradictory trends interplaying at various levels 
simultaneously.  
Furthermore, Rosenau sees global governance on a continuum, with formal 
rules at one end and a loose set of norms at the other.
24
 Along this continuum, various 
factors combine to create a set of arrangements and regulated patterns that cohere into 
a global order.25 Importantly, Rosenau highlights the ‘intersubjective consensus’ of 
bottom up consent and the relevance of widespread legitimacy of governance.
26
 This 
concept captures the importance of voluntary participation by global actors in creating 
                                                 
22
 James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., Governance Without Government: Order and Change 
in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
23
 James Rosenau, 'Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics', in Governance Without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 12-14. 
24
 Idem. Rosenau’s concept of a continuum is further discussed in James N. Rosenau, ‘Governance in 
the Twenty-First Century’, Global Governance 6 (1995): 13-43. 
25
 Rosenau, ‘Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics’, pp. 12-14. 
26
 Ibid., p. 14; For further discussion of Rosenau’s concept of intersubjective consensus as it relates to 
global governance, see Rosenau, ‘Governance in the Twenty-First Century’, p. 15. 
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norms that guide decision making, even when there is no identifiable common 
interest. Moreover, such an interpretation of global governance recognises the 
complexities at work in contemporary global governance. 
Most observers acknowledge that there are a myriad of interests, often 
competing for influence, that impact on global governance. Rosenau’s approach 
provides a theoretical framework that enables scholars to acknowledge the organic 
nature of the international system, recognise its dynamism and accommodate its 
volatility. A key component of Rosenau’s approach is his acceptance of conflicting 
forces in a constant state of interplay. As he has argued in his article ‘Governance in 
the Twenty-First Century’, published in the journal Global Governance (1995): 
to anticipate the prospects for global governance in the decades ahead is to 
discern powerful tensions, profound contradictions, and perplexing paradoxes 
… it is to look for authorities that are obscure, boundaries that are in flux and 
systems of rule that are emergent.27  
Such a theoretical approach enables scholars to avoid a linear analysis of global 
governance, which cannot be viewed in the same way that domestic governance is 
viewed. When assessing traditional domestic governance, scholars are able to identify 
clear, unambiguous lines of authority that derive that authority through publicly 
articulated rules or conventions. Yet the genesis of much of the authority that 
influences global governance is not easily identified. Some of the authority at play in 
the modern global order is based on rules or conventions, but much of that authority 
derives its role in the international system through epistemic means that reflect 
Rosenau’s concept of intersubjective consensus. Given this thesis is seeking to 
                                                 
27
 Rosenau, ‘Governance in the Twenty-First Century’, p. 13.  
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analyse the role of credit rating agencies on contemporary global governance, 
Rosenau’s conceptual framework provides a valuable structure through which an 
assessment of that role can be undertaken.  
For the purposes of this thesis, credit rating agencies will be defined as those 
agencies that assign a rating to the providers of debt obligations as well as the debt 
instruments themselves. Specifically, when referring to these agencies, I will be 
referring to those rating agencies that have a significant global presence. This 
definition limits any analysis to the three main credit rating agencies: Moody’s, 
Standards and Poor’s and Fitch. When seeking to assess the impact of credit rating 
agencies on contemporary global governance, I will use O’Brien and Williams’ 
definition of global governance as the ‘overarching system which regulates human 
affairs on a worldwide basis’.28 The same authors acknowledge that ‘the rules of 
global governance are created by the actions and agreements of key actors in the 
global system’.29  
This definitional concept enables scholars to assess the role of credit rating 
agencies in contemporary global governance in the context of their influence on the 
overarching system that shapes the way various actors conduct their affairs. Credit 
rating agencies set out explicit expectations of state and non-state actors that 
effectively regulate their behaviour through the ratings process. Their assessments are 
backed up with action, in the form of changes to credit ratings applied to various 
financial products, that influences how governance is conducted. Technology, 
communication, disintermediation and scale mean the contemporary global system 
                                                 
28
 Marc Williams and Robert O'Brien, Global Political Economy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004), p. 316. 
29
 Ibid., p. 317. 
 20 
has a dizzying array of complexity that can create challenges for scholars seeking 
trends in the international system. Clear definitional foundations provide much needed 
clarity around key concepts and provide context for analysis of specific actors, 
regardless of the nature of their formalised role.  
Credit rating agencies are not acknowledged in nation-state constitutions, nor 
are they formally acknowledged in the annual reports of many major financial 
institutions or central banks. Yet their deliberations have a significant impact on the 
evaluation of credit, the flow of money and the investment decisions that ensue. These 
institutions have secured a significant role in the contemporary international system, 
thanks to the cooperation of traditional actors such as states and international 
government organisations (IGOs). The emergence of the nation state was marked by 
easily identifiable events such as the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. In contrast, the 
emergence of credit rating agencies on the global scene was not marked by a formal 
declaration by any actor, but rather it emerged over time based on perceived epistemic 
authority. Assessing the impact of such actors therefore requires a theoretical 
framework that acknowledges the fluidity of global governance, the conflicting forces 
seeking to influence the international system and the lack of clearly definable roles 
and responsibilities.  
Credit rating agencies do not roam the global stage unchallenged. Some 
nation-states openly defy their guidance on credit issues, as seen in Venezuela, while 
others query their capacity to execute their stated aims objectively and effectively. In 
2008, the EU carried out a review into credit rating agencies in response to the sub-
prime crisis. EU Commissioner McGreevy publicly stated that he was: 
 21 
convinced, like others in Europe, of the need to legislate in this area at EU 
level. CRAs (credit rating agencies) will have to comply with exacting 
regulatory requirements to make sure ratings are not tainted by the conflicts of 
interest inherent to the ratings business. The crisis has shown that self-
regulation has not worked.30  
These challenges to the authority of credit rating agencies were triggered by a 
significant event, in this case market failure resulting in the 2008 financial crisis. 
However, the reaction by powerful actors in global governance to the crisis set the 
stage for a struggle between those advocating tighter regulation and those who 
acknowledged the need for state actors to appropriately direct their rescue packages 
with the assistance of rating agencies. This state of conflict, unthinkable in early 2007, 
raises poignant questions regarding the future of global governance, but also compels 
scholars to see governance as an organic concept that is a constant state of flux. 
Much of the literature relating to contemporary global governance seeks to 
address how such conflicts play out in terms of governance outcomes. Rosenau 
highlights the need for participation, because ‘governance is a system of rules that 
works only if it is accepted by the majority, whereas governments can function even 
in the face of widespread opposition to their policies’.31 To obtain such acceptance, it 
is imperative for any system of governance that basic rights and responsibilities are 
clearly defined. Donahue and Nye draw attention to a hierarchy of governance: 
the first level of governance is providing the intellectual and institutional 
infrastructure of a market system. Property rights must be defined. Rule for 
                                                 
30
 European Union, 'Consultation by the Commission Services on Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs)', 
(Brussels, 2008), accessed 31/7/08, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1224&format=HTML&aged=0&langu
age=EN&guiLanguage=fr 
31
 Rosenau, 'Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics', p. 5. 
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private exchange must be put into place. Procedures must be established for 
enforcing commitments, resolving disputes and sanctioning defaults. These 
foundation and housekeeping responsibilities … go little noticed.32  
If these factors are the basic premise for any system of global governance, it is evident 
the role of the credit rating agencies is now integral to how the international system 
operates. They play a key role in calibrating the contemporary rules for provision of 
credit and the private exchange of capital. The rating agencies also establish 
procedures for monitoring various actors and instruments and enforce norms through 
a complex rating system. 
Conceptually, any theoretical construct that provides for a dynamic build of 
rules and responsibilities in global governance provides scholars with an enhanced 
capacity to assess the role of individual actors. In the case of the rating agencies, who 
seek to guide other actors on important investment decisions, their role is only 
relevant when other actors cooperate and engage. Using Rosenau’s concept of 
majority acceptance as a benchmark,
33
 it is evident that over recent years, the rating 
agencies have had significant acceptance of their role amongst major state and non-
state actors on the global stage. However, the scope of this acceptance is occasionally 
tested, raising challenges for observers of the contemporary global system. For 
example, how do such challenges materially impact on the ability of credit rating 
agencies to influence the investment decisions of other actors? Do any changes in 
their role impact the way global governance is conducted in the future? Clearly, there 
is fluidity around the roles of various actors in the international system and frequently 
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their roles rapidly evolve without formal changes to written guidelines or rules. For 
observers of the global system, such an acknowledgement increases the importance of 
frequent observations of the international system and regular reassessments of the 
changing roles of various actors whose influence ebbs and flows. 
Some of the systemic changes in the international system can be traced to 
changes in the logistics of interaction between various actors. Mark Zacher 
highlighted the role technology plays in accelerating the demise of sovereignty and 
accelerating the pace of change within a newly globalised paradigm.34 Clearly, the 
technical capability to transfer credit and investment across state boundaries has had a 
critical enabling function for the rise of a genuinely global financial system. The 
speed of technological change continues to increase, causing the pace of shifts in 
authority between various actors in the contemporary international system to 
accelerate. The challenges scholars face in observing global governance and giving its 
functionality structure can become significant. The global system at the end of 2008 
had altered, even when compared to six months earlier. Dramatic economic and 
financial shocks lead to dramatic shifts in the policies of a range of actors. The 
prospect of international political economy scholars keeping pace with these shifts 
and being able to analyse their implications can be problematic.  
For the purposes of this research into the role of the credit rating agencies, the 
2008 financial crisis created such challenges. The very real threat of systemic failure 
in the world’s financial system following the collapse of Lehman Brothers saw non-
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state actors in the financial markets clamour for state intervention, after vigorously 
opposing such intervention for decades. This dramatic shift altered the global 
governance equilibrium, giving state actors, particularly in developed economies, an 
elevated role in the financial system. However, the ongoing failure of these state 
actors to develop a coordinated response to the challenge left a vacuum that has been 
filled once again by the rating agencies. To analyse these seismic changes in the 
global governance structure, theoretical frameworks that provide for this dynamism 
are critical.  
Rosenau’s organic approach to governance issues provides a framework for 
such analysis. His biospheric approach lies at the juncture of many conflicting issues 
about the nature of contemporary global governance and differing conclusions can be 
drawn based on his assessments. Edward Comor, for example, has argued that 
qualitative analysis directs scholars to acknowledge that power is actually centralising 
around core governance institutions that are based on information flows.
35
 These 
information flows are based on what Comor calls a ‘complex set’ of ‘conceptual 
systems and cultures—forged and modified through institutional, organizational and 
technological mediators—thus constituting key nodal points shaping what is 
known’.36 Comor goes on to note that ‘information in and of itself is meaningless 
without the presence of a conceptual system that facilitates particular 
understandings’.37 Thus, the control of that information is paradoxically diffused as 
technological developments empower individuals to create their own conceptual 
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systems through which to they process information. In the face of this fracturing, 
actors are coalescing around reliable and traditional sources of information, namely 
core governance institutions such as governments and media outlets.38 While Comor 
takes a more structured approach to governance issues, his theories help explain the 
epistemic authority enjoyed by rating agencies in the absence of credible global 
alternatives.  
One trait widely recognised by international political economy scholars is the 
increase in complexity and the commensurate burgeoning information flows evident 
in the modern global system. Technological and communication improvements have 
created an explosion of information, making the distillation of that information a 
critical component of any governance system. Comor’s view that actors focus on 
trustworthy sources of information when faced with such complexities raises 
important questions around which modern actors are regarded as authoritative sources 
of information.
39
 At the same time, geographic considerations are being diminished. 
Tony Porter observed that contemporary information flows have undermined 
‘territoriality as an organizing principle of the states system’.40 Porter goes on to argue 
that this has left states in a weakened position, because their own jurisdictional 
restrictions prevent them from having carriage of information flows beyond their 
borders, while global, ‘knowledge-producing epistemic communities’ have risen to 
the fore.41 Credit rating agencies clearly are knowledge producing, global and 
authoritative epistemic sources of information that are highly valued by many actors 
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in the global system. They have grown in size and strength due to the high demand for 
their assessments of the creditworthiness of state and non-state actors. Their 
emergence on the global stage is directly correlated with the undermining of 
territoriality as an organising principal. Investors in global commodities, TNCs or 
even currency products no longer think of events in each state as being definitive. 
Rather, contemporary investors think through a global prism and require regularly 
updated information from sources they see as reliable. The rating agencies have 
successfully addressed this need, positioning themselves in a powerful position in the 
modern global system.  
It should be noted that the emergence of informal authority sources has not 
caused belief in a more structured global governance system to disappear. One 
challenge to Rosenau’s organic approach to global governance emerged in the mid-
1990s, with the release of a report by the United Nation’s Commission for Global 
Governance entitled, Report on Our Global Neighbourhood. In that document, the 
Commission outlined a prescriptive set of expectations that should guide global 
governance, based on the view that ‘the world’s arrangements for the conduct of its 
affairs must be underpinned by certain common values’.42 The Commission set out to 
establish a system of global governance in the post-cold war environment that had a 
clear and transparent set of guidelines that were essentially incontestable by various 
actors, to provide certainty and stability and enhance cooperation and exchange in the 
international system. Global Neighbourhood was provocative, if somewhat ambitious, 
reflecting the hope that with the demise of global cold war divisions, actors would 
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embrace a set of mutually agreed guidelines to reduce conflict and enhance 
governance standards. Global events at both a political and economic level since 1995 
suggest that such a prescriptive approach is unlikely to take hold in the contemporary 
international system.  
While such an aspirational view of governance can seem unrealistic, it remains 
evident that structure is indeed required for the contemporary international system to 
function. Citing the work of twentieth-century American Sociologist, Talcott Parsons, 
Robert Latham has observed that in order ‘to achieve the function of governance, 
‘rule systems and control mechanisms’ must operate’.43 How these rule systems and 
control mechanisms are developed and which actors have carriage over any 
enforcement mechanisms becomes central to any assessment on the nature of the 
international system. Given this thesis is seeking to identify the role credit rating 
agencies have in establishing and maintaining rule systems though the use of powerful 
control mechanisms, Latham’s recognition of these factors as building blocks to any 
governance system creates a useful framework for further analysis.  
One overriding theme in the literature relating to contemporary global 
governance is the reduced ability of the sovereign states to establish rule systems and 
administer binding control mechanisms. This trend is seen by many as critical to 
allowing actors such as the credit rating agencies to emerge as influential players in 
the current global system. Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, states have played 
a pivotal role in global governance. Two key developments have significantly eroded 
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that role —the persistent pursuit of liberal policies that have transferred authority 
away from states and toward market mechanisms and improvements in technology 
and communications that have made information and authority more transferable over 
increasingly porous national borders.  
At the same time the Commission for Global Governance was seeking a 
multilateral consensus on governance, Susan Strange was highlighting the weakened 
position of nation states as large responsibilities shifted from state actors to private 
and global actors. In The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World 
Economy from 1996, Strange argued that ‘where states were once masters of the 
markets, now it is the markets, which, on many critical issues, are the masters over 
governments of states’.44 Strange went on to demonstrate the broad range of policy 
areas where governments had abrogated responsibility to the financial markets, often 
in the name of economic liberalisation. This in part reflects the growing capacity of 
financial markets to absorb such responsibilities. As observed by Donahue and Nye, 
‘markets have become more extensive, more integrated, and more intricately 
interwoven into the fabric of life’.45 Such observations provide a poignant basis for an 
assessment of the role of rating agencies in the contemporary global system. These 
organisations have accumulated significant technical capabilities along with epistemic 
authority, which has facilitated their accumulation of responsibilities from state 
actors. This institutional capacity has a symbiotic relationship with the decline of state 
ownership and control over many of the levers of economic management.  
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Much of the literature written on this shift has focused on the environmental 
changes to the international system that eroded the ability of state actors to maintain 
control over key components of their economies and societies. This trend can be 
benchmarked against recognised variables that support state control. Mark Zacher 
identified six pillars that boosted state autonomy and power that included, ‘low levels 
of economic interdependence’, ‘low information flows that limit the growth of 
economic interdependence’, ‘a predominance of authoritarian or non-democratic 
governments that limit the flow of information’ and ‘a high degree of cultural, 
political and economic heterogeneity amongst states that makes the coordination of 
policies difficult’.46 Clearly, these factors have been increasingly absent from the 
international system for some decades, enhancing the capacity of non-state actors 
such as the rating agencies to assume greater responsibilities. Geoffrey Underhill has 
discussed the growth of international finance in the context of declining state power, 
noting ‘as capital has become more mobile, firms and markets have become for trans-
national, enhancing their power in relation to governments, which remain territorially 
based’.47 In a sense, the international system has outgrown national boundaries, 
leaving states increasingly unable to control the most basic of functions in a market 
economy such as the provision of credit and the flow of capital. 
Much has been written on the implications of the growth of international 
finance, particularly capital mobility. As Sinclair and Thomas have noted ‘few 
pressures impinge on the policy choices of nation states to the extent that capital 
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mobility does’.48 Similarly, in States and Markets (1988), Susan Strange identified the 
globalisation of the financial markets as having a major effect in shifting authority in 
the international political economy,49 while later observing that because of the 
mobility of capital and the rivalry of states as borrowers, the markets have the 
authority to reward or punish according to their judgement.50 Clearly, such 
dependence by state actors on capital flows has emerged as the ability of the state to 
control capital has declined. This shift in capital dependence will be a focus of further 
research. 
The second trend that is frequently attributed to the erosion of the authority of 
state actors in the contemporary global system is the sustained advances in 
communications and technology. At a basic level, developments such as the 
expansion of the numerate mode over the literate mode through the use of digital 
systems and the global spread of the English language have augmented the flow of 
international communication, which have become cheaper and easier.51 While much is 
taken for granted by observers of the contemporary global system, it is critical to 
remember that such trends have provided the building blocks for today’s relatively 
seamless global network. As Karen Litfin argues, ‘technologies of knowledge 
production…… promote certain actors and discourses as authoritative in the evolution 
of global governance’.52 Indeed, scholars have analysed the implications of 
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technological change to observe its connection to power. For example, J. P. Singh has 
noted that ‘instrumental power focuses on the capacity or capability of power holders 
to effect particular outcomes. Information technologies…are then forces that enhance 
these capabilities’.53 
Technology’s role in the emerging landscape of contemporary global 
governance is hard to overstate. For instance, Rosenau noted that, 
few dissent from the proposition that advances in transportation and electronic 
technologies, and especially the internet, have resulted in a transformation, a 
compression if not a collapse of time and distance, as well as altered 
conceptions of hierarchy, territory, sovereignty and the state.54  
These changes have completely reshaped global governance. State power has simply 
been unable to keep pace with scope of technological change and the commensurate 
decline of territory-based authority. As China has discovered, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult for a state actor to attempt to control access to and information 
from the Internet. Zacher’s six pillars have come under sustained challenge thanks to 
improvements in technology, permanently altering the power structure within the 
international system.  
For rating agencies, these technological changes have augmented their 
capacity to influence global affairs. These organisations have been issuing ratings for 
over one hundred years,55 yet their influence on global governance has risen 
significantly in recent times. Technology has not only enabled rating agencies to 
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increase the scope and pace of their activities, but has facilitated the growth of a 
global market for investment that has become incredibly influential on the 
international order. The current literature provides important context for how these 
developments have shifted power and permanently recalibrated the hierarchy of actors 
in contemporary global governance.  
Assessments relating to technological improvements and the declining role of 
the state can only go part of the way to providing a framework that adequately 
assesses the current international system from a governance perspective. Such 
analysis cannot see the relationship between state and non-state actors as a binary. 
The loss of authority by states is not automatically correlated with an equal gain in 
responsibility by institutions such as the credit rating agencies. Contemporary global 
governance is by its very nature fluid, due to the complex web of interrelated interests 
that shape how the international system operates. Rosenau draws the clear distinction 
between what a government can control and governance, observing that the latter is ‘a 
system of rule that works only if it is accepted by the majority (or, at least, the most 
powerful), whereas governments can function even in the face of widespread 
opposition to their policies’.56 Such observations bring the notion of authority to the 
fore of any assessments on how particular actors influence current affairs. 
Importantly, much of the literature surrounding the subject of contemporary 
global governance examines the role of power, discussing who has it, how it is 
exercised and what its impact is on various global actors. In States and Markets 
(1988), Susan Strange’s analysis of power and its interplay with knowledge has 
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significant implications for any assessment of the role of rating agencies in the 
contemporary global system. In particular, her dissection of power between structural 
power and relational power provides context for scholars seeking to place actors 
within a perceived hierarchy of influence and authority. Strange defines relational 
power as the power of A to get B to do something they would not otherwise do, 
whereas structural power is the power to determine how things shall be done, the 
power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people 
or relate to corporate enterprises.
57
  In a sense, Strange sees structural power as the 
power to determine the structures of the global political economy.58 Strange goes on to 
identify four sources to structural power—‘control over security, control over 
production, control over credit and control over knowledge, beliefs and ideas’.59 
Finance, in particular the control of credit, is highlighted as the facet that has risen in 
importance in recent times, more rapidly than any other and the facet that has come to 
have ‘decisive importance’ due to its ‘power to determine outcomes’.60 
It can be argued that relational power, crudely typified by warfare, has given 
way to structural power within the contemporary global system. Using Strange’s 
sources of structural power, it is evident that rating agencies have acquired such 
power through their ability to control credit and knowledge. A wide range of state and 
non-state actors operate within guidelines explicitly set by rating agencies. These 
agencies have effectively created the paradigm within which actors operate. As 
Strange points out, the control of credit flows has risen to prominence, again 
highlighting the powerful role rating agencies have acquired due to their perceived 
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capacity to determine credit worthiness.
61
 These agencies do not compel actors to 
cooperate with their activities. Rather, actors opt in, encouraged to do so because of 
their recognition of the epistemic authority the rating agencies have. Rosenau’s 
required majority support is clearly at play,
62
 with state and non-state actors 
coalescing around the validity of the edicts of organisations such as Standard and 
Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings.  
Strange’s observation about the growing importance of the finance sector 
reinforces the strong role credit relations have in the international system. Strange 
defines finance as ‘the system by which credit is created, bought and sold and by 
which the direction and use of capital is determined’.63 While the scale of finance’s 
role in how human affairs are regulated is new, its presence is not. Andrew, Henning 
and Pauly draw attention to the old Roman maxim ‘money alone set the world in 
motion’ to highlight the timeless importance the flow of money has on the 
international system.64 Indeed, there has been much written about the growing 
importance of international finance, particularly in relation to actors in the system 
seeking to attract investment by implementing policies that are perceived as market 
friendly. A growing pool of capital responds to such signals. The rating agencies play 
a critical role in the process of steering capital through the matrix of contemporary 
investment options, providing clarity for investors who face a dizzying array of global 
investment opportunities. The source of this structural power, as identified by Strange, 
lies in the ability to control credit and knowledge.  
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One of the key factors leading to rating agencies becoming able to assume 
control of knowledge is disintermediation of communication between the suppliers 
and users of credit. Historically, such a relationship would have centred on an 
intermediary such as a bank, but now the borrower and lender can cut through the 
middleman via the money markets.65 As Sinclair has noted, disintermediation has seen 
‘the movement from an institutionalised world of legal authorities towards a 
decentralised, marketized world’ of credit.66 Furthermore, Sinclair regards the 
development of epistemic authorities such as rating agencies, who substitute their 
information and expertise for bank judgements, as an important consequence of 
disintermediation.
67
 This process spurred what Sinclair has called the ‘Global 
Information Economy’, which has a tendency to ‘homogenize thought’, through what 
he terms ‘cognitive centralization’.68 These observations have important ramifications 
for how knowledge is distributed, how credit relations develop and where authority 
lies in the contemporary international system. For scholars seeking to provide context 
around the growing importance of credit rating agencies, disintermediation and its 
logical consequences provide structure to the empirical evidence of a fundamental 
shift in credit relations and ultimately in power flows. 
Mark Amen’s observations on how knowledge impacts credit relations further 
clarifies the nature of contemporary global finance. Amen clearly draws the 
connection between knowledge and power, particularly as the range of options for 
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potential investors has exploded.69 Beyond this connection, Amen observes that 
‘knowledge is housed in a hierarchical setting’, with various actors ceding 
responsibility to acquire knowledge to others, in effect creating new sources of 
authority in the global system.70 This authority can be observed at its most basic level 
in the previous financial rescue packages for the currencies of Mexico, Thailand and 
Indonesia, which prescribed ‘these countries adopt liberal economic, fiscal, monetary 
and trade policies as a condition for receiving the loans’.71 Examples such as this 
demonstrate that knowledge does indeed generate authority, which in turn generates 
or reinforces hierarchies.  
Amen’s analysis provides the theoretical framework around the role rating 
agencies play in the current global system. Through their assiduous development of 
exclusive knowledge capabilities, these agencies have positioned themselves at the 
top of the knowledge hierarchy, seemingly impervious to the ebbs and flows of 
authority experienced by other actors. This is illustrated by the fact that Standard and 
Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings emerged from the 2008 financial crisis in an 
empowered position. Regardless of any mistakes that they are perceived to have 
made, no other actor can come close to acquiring the knowledge base so effectively 
accumulated by rating agencies. While their operating environment may change, their 
position at the top of the knowledge food chain appears un-contestable.  
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Jan Toporowski clarifies the source of this perennial authority, highlighting 
that modern capital markets are accompanied by a permanent buzz of new 
information.72 Toporowski points out that this has a material impact on the markets:  
Whereas actual prices are principally determined by the net inflow into the 
capital market and notional prices are principally determined by a 
conventional interpretation of news and statistics, effective prices are 
influenced on the demand side by the adjustments that companies make 
through the capital market to their balance sheet and their liquidity.73  
Global news networks such as CNBC and Bloomberg bear testament to the insatiable 
appetite for information in the contemporary financial markets. In an era where 
information is plentiful and knowledge is closely linked to authority, the role of rating 
agencies comes into perspective. 
Beyond that research which has a more theoretical base, much of the 
contemporary analysis conducted on the rating agencies focuses on the functions they 
carry out within a complex interplay between state and non-state actors across the 
globe. This research is often conducted from a financial perspective or from the 
perspective of a participant in the ratings process. One of the earliest detailed reviews 
of how credit rating agencies operate was a report commissioned by the Twentieth 
Century Fund Task Force on Municipal Bond Credit Ratings in 1974. The report was 
entitled The Rating Game and included a background paper by John E. Petersen, 
which outlined how rating agencies assessed the creditworthiness of municipal and 
state authorities in the United States and highlighted improvements that could be 
made.  
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It is noteworthy that the similarities between the issues raised in The Rating 
Game and the issues being discussed by contemporary scholars are numerous. For 
example, Petersen draws attention to the need for some sort of rating of municipal and 
state bonds ‘since the investor is unable to detail the creditworthiness of each of the 
thousands of issues traded daily’, and that the impact of a rating on a particular bond 
can be dramatic in terms of interest rate differentials of 100 basis points.74 Petersen 
highlights that banks and insurance regulatory bodies have been ‘delegating their 
responsibility to the rating agencies and thereby impose a burden of fiscal dependence 
upon the private rating agencies’.75 
The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force recommended greater transparency, 
so that those being rated and those buying the ratings have a better understanding of 
how those ratings are developed, including a full disclosure of the criteria used for 
particular appraisals. Furthermore, to enhance the accountability of the ratings 
process, the Task Force recommended the establishment of a central data bank that 
included the reports of the fiscal condition of state and local government borrowers 
and their debt obligations.76  
Thirty-four years later, similar recommendations were made by the EU, which 
announced draft laws that would require rating agencies to ‘register with European 
regulators and submit to monitoring by national authorities; disclose how they 
determine risk; and make changes in their corporate governance to prevent conflicts 
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of interest’.77 The EU went further, publicly stating that rating agencies had 
‘understated the danger’ associated with sub prime mortgages in the US and that this 
‘raised concerns about their competence and their cosy relationship with the financial 
industry’.78 Regulators have obviously sought to gain greater control over the 
operations of rating agencies over many decades, yet to date, these efforts have failed 
to provide the transparency and comfort that many actors seek. Furthermore, these 
attempts have failed to fundamentally challenge the authority of credit rating 
agencies.  
Much of the contemporary analysis focuses on the role of the rating agencies 
because that very basic tenant of analysis is challenging to define due to the opaque 
nature of their activities. The rating process is complex and relates to a myriad of 
financial products, some of which are very sophisticated and hard to define. As 
discussed in the introduction to this thesis, Timothy Sinclair’s The New Masters of 
Capital from 2005 provides much needed context for scholars seeking a greater 
understanding of the rating agencies.
79
 Sinclair’s work builds a conceptual structure 
for these organisations using counterfactual analysis to test the strength of the 
observations being made. This process excludes the most likely cause of a particular 
response and then enables observers to assess alternative causes.  
Sinclair tracks the history of the rating agencies and their meteoric rise, noting 
that in the 1960s, Standard and Poor’s had just three staff.80 Sinclair admits that rating 
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agencies are ‘some of the most obscure institutions in the world of global finance’,81 
but credits them for remaining relevant and keeping up with financial innovation.82 
The important role of knowledge networks is discussed, with Sinclair noting that ‘as 
banks are displaced as key investment sources, gatekeeper power is concentrated in 
the hands of the small number of rating agencies. Rating has become a key means of 
transmitting the policy orthodoxy of managerial best practise’.83 He notes that rating 
agencies rate around US$30 trillion in debt obligations and that their activities reflect 
a store of expertise and intellectual authority.84 His research also analyses how the 
ratings are compiled, the implications of the rating judgements and how those 
judgements shape the international system.  
One of the most far reaching observations made by Sinclair is that the ratings 
produced rating agencies are not formulaic and linear, but rather subjective and based 
on judgements.  These judgements imply gate keeping, which is ‘manifestly 
political’.85 Such observations have significant ramifications for scholars seeking a 
greater understanding of the role of rating agencies in contemporary global 
governance. The strong correlation between the assessments made by the rating 
agencies and the cost of debt and flow of investment is well documented. If there are 
political and subjective components to the rating process, the ratings the agencies 
produce are more malleable than could otherwise be assumed, creating a reactive 
interplay between various actors and those who determine their ratings.  
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Sinclair uses an Australian example to demonstrate this point.  In 1993, the 
new Victorian State Government’s dramatic cutbacks announced in the State Budget 
were defended by then State Treasurer Alan Stockdale, who said at the time there 
‘was no alternative’, and that ‘Moody’s downgrading of Victoria two rungs on the 
credit ladder graphically illustrated the consequences of excessive debt’.86 
Demonstrating the subjective nature of their assessments, a Moody’s analyst noted 
that there was a ‘large difference’ in the policies of the two major parties at the time in 
the state of Victoria.
87
 Like the Indian example provided earlier in the previous 
chapter, rating agencies use both incentives and disincentives to encourage actors to 
adhere to their prescribed approach to policy implementation. For state actors, this has 
become increasingly important. It has also ensured that states are complicit in 
supporting the structural changes that dilute their influence. As Sinclair has noted, 
‘resistance to tax increases is also behind the increasing use of innovative financing 
instruments like derivatives, which offer higher returns’.88 
Sinclair’s assessment is that the most subjective area of rating agency activity 
is sovereign ratings, which ‘incorporates opaque quality of life factors and what seem 
to be overtly political variables’.89 Using Moody’s own criteria, Sinclair highlights 
that factors such as ‘the degree and nature of political intrusiveness in the cultivation 
of wealth, the depth and experience of government bureaucrats, political intrusiveness 
in economic management, political links with foreign partners, past behaviour under 
stress and regime legitimacy’ are all factors that influence sovereign ratings.90 These 
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variables are highly susceptible to subjective assessments, particularly in markets with 
which the agency is not familiar. Sinclair’s analysis demonstrates that the rating 
agencies are not simply applying an objective set of criteria onto each actor or 
instrument they rate. Rather, they are applying a set of judgements to help them assess 
the willingness and ability of a receiver of credit to pay that credit back. Such 
subjectivity stimulates a contested dialogue between those who rate and those who are 
rated. 
The views of the authors discussed in this literature review have created a 
conceptual framework for further analysis of the rating agencies and their influence 
on global governance. By taking a more organic approach to governance, it is possible 
for scholars to observe and assess the rapidly evolving international system and 
provide structure to the complex relationships that shape contemporary global 
governance. Broad trends that have facilitated the rise of rating agencies such as the 
retreat of the state, improvements in technology and disintermediation have been 
discussed in the context of a hierarchy of knowledge and authority. The contemporary 
position of the rating agencies has been reviewed, with a particular focus on the 
subjective and political nature of the rating process. Following this literature review 
process, it is evident that there is a growing acknowledgement of the important role 
rating agencies play in the international system. However, for scholars to gain a better 
understanding of how global governance is influenced by the rating agencies, an 
improved understanding of the interplay between the rating agencies and those actors 
susceptible to political or subjective decisions warrants further analysis.  
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One useful way of focusing such analysis is observing the process of 
sovereign ratings. While there are many relevant case studies highlighted in the 
existing analysis, they tend to be observed through the prism of identifying the cause 
and effect. A typical case study observes that a if country’s sovereign debt position 
deteriorates, its credit rating is lowered by the rating agencies. In turn, that country’s 
currency falls and the cost of borrowing in that market increases as foreign lenders 
charge more for credit. Policy makers then seek to reverse the negative rating by 
reeling in debt and reversing the process. Observations of this process do not 
adequately address the importance of the nature of the interaction between rating 
agencies and sovereign markets. How that interaction takes place and how rating 
agency analysts seek to influence the policy formation process are important issues. 
Given the acknowledged subjectivity at play and the demonstrable bias towards more 
market-orientated policies, how do states seek to influence rating agencies on their 
assessments on issues as opaque as what Sinclair described as ‘political intrusiveness 
in economic management’?91  
It is important to note that non-state actors are also heavily influenced by 
sovereign ratings. TNCs are impacted by a negative sovereign rating in a particular 
market due to the ensuing fluctuations in the currency market, changes to domestic 
interest rates and changes to the cost of foreign debt products. Observers of the 
international political economy have a relatively clear understanding of how state 
actors and TNCs interact with themselves and each other on a regular basis, providing 
an empirical framework for theoretical applications.  
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A deeper understanding of the interaction between sovereign markets and 
rating agencies will provide scholars with a better understanding of how the 
inclinations of sovereign decision makers are actually determined and what role each 
actor has in shaping those determinations. If credit rating agencies acknowledge 
political factors are central to sovereign ratings, how do the rating agencies make 
assessments in this area? Do they simply interpret the public decisions of policy 
makers, or is the process more sophisticated? Do they seek to shape policy before it is 
made, say before a major budget initiative, or do the simply react to decisions after 
they are made? Do representatives from sovereign markets actively seek to shape 
these assessments, or are they more passive? The answer to these questions are 
particularly relevant in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis when the role of 
rating agencies and state actors has become more topical.  
A deeper analysis of the interaction between rating agencies and state actors 
on sovereign rating issues will compliment existing research and provide a more 
holistic assessment of rating agencies and their influence on global governance. As 
scholars observe tectonic shifts in the financial system, sovereign debt levels have 
risen to historically high levels as government borrowing increases. This dramatic 
adjustment in policy makes sovereign ratings a key enabler for many state actors. The 
next chapter will provide context for this important development by demonstrating the 
massive growth of money supply and the increasing use of debt instruments by state 
actors to fund spending. While the reduction in tax revenue is well documented, the 
growth of dependence on the issuance of government bonds has altered behaviour and 
empowered the rating agencies to influence state actors in a way that was simply 
unimaginable only thirty years ago. Understanding the relationship between rating 
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agencies and state actors will provide critical context for those seeking to understand 
how modern human affairs are regulated on a global scale. 
This literature review provides an important theoretical construct for such an 
analysis. Rosenau’s organic interpretation of global governance accommodates for 
inconsistencies evident in how rating agencies and state actors interact. Similarly, 
Sinclair’s concept of cognitive centralisation and the emergence of homogenous 
thought becomes more relevant when considered alongside Amen’s linkage between 
knowledge and power. These theories help explain the emergence of the rating 
agencies as a seminal actor in contemporary global governance. In addition, Strange’s 
concept of structural power adds another layer of theoretical context to the 
contemporary role rating agencies enjoy. The importance of technology in promoting 
knowledge production and empowering certain actors, as acknowledged by Litfin, is 
important in an era when state and non-state actors can struggle to keep up with an 
ever expanding information flow in the financial markets. As a result, Zacher’s pillars 
of state autonomy continue to be eroded, with the assistance of the rating agencies, 
further weakening this once dominant player in the international system.  
Despite the significance of this shift in contemporary global governance, 
Rosenau’s majority support threshold continues to be surpassed,92 as increasing 
numbers of actors look for guidance from the rating agencies and provide or seek 
credit that has been rated to augment investment. This investment has become the 
lifeblood of the contemporary international system, making those who steer its path 
powerful and auspicious actors whose actions and influence warrant greater analysis. 
                                                 
92
 Rosenau, 'Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics', p. 5. 
 46 
Chapter Two: 
The Emergence of Credit as the Lifeblood of Contemporary Global Governance 
Much of the literature on contemporary global governance has focused on the 
decline of state actors and the emergence of global finance as a major factor in the 
functioning of the contemporary international system. The pursuit of liberal policy 
settings by decision makers in many developed and developing countries is identified 
as a determining variable behind the documented shifts in the global system. While 
the shift in authority toward non-state actors is well documented, the governance 
ramifications of the emergence of rating agencies as influential participants in the 
international system and the corresponding decline of state actors deserves greatly 
scholarly attention. The scale and pace of the recalibration of the international system 
have caused a deficit in the understanding of how global governance has changed. 
Like most changes to the international system, significant global events bring shifts in 
the power structure to prominence.  
The 2008 global financial crisis and the reaction to the crisis by state actors 
provided a reminder on the hierarchy of power in contemporary global governance. 
The perceived impotence of state actors in the face of a rapid deterioration in the 
global financial markets and the corresponding impact on both the broader economy 
and state finances illustrated the incapacity of state actors to employ governance tools 
that can keep pace with innovation in the financial markets. The 2008 global financial 
crisis illuminated the scale of cross-border engagement in global finance and the role 
technology plays to augment and amplify significant movements in the global 
financial system.   
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Against this background, the inadequacy of state-based responses to genuinely 
global financial crises became apparent. This period also reinforced the reliance of 
state actors on the financial system. Following the crisis, state actors in many 
developed markets provided direct and indirect financial assistance to private 
financial institutions to prevent systemic failure and more broadly to stimulate the 
economy. To fund these activities, the sale of government bonds increased, fostering 
the dependence of state actors on credit creation. This credit creation took place 
through engagement with private actors in global finance. The fact that the rating 
agencies emerged from the crisis with their power and influence not only intact, but 
enhanced, demonstrates the fundamental importance of credit for all actors in the 
modern international system.  
Credit creation is a seminal component of the modern international system. 
This process is supported by a plethora of complex financial products, the nature of 
which few state-based policy makers understand. Indeed, the role of credit creation is 
a poignant symbol of the structural, as well as relational power now enjoyed by the 
rating agencies. Rating agencies are now shaping the global structure in which actors 
operate and employing specific measures, both direct and indirect, to influence 
specific actors to take certain actions. Using Susan Strange’s four sources of structural 
power,
93
 it is evident that rating agencies have obtained control to a significant extent 
over knowledge, beliefs and credit.  
In the absence of state-based structural power that effectively controls global 
behaviour, particularly behaviour relating to credit provisioning and the financial 
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markets, rating agencies are able to exert influence over many facets of contemporary 
global governance. They have assumed this power by controlling the knowledge that 
determines credit worthiness while also controlling the conceptual systems, to use 
Comor’s term,94 that guides various state and non-state actors. This is a determining 
factor behind the power structures of the modern international system. While it has 
already been acknowledged by Strange that control over finance has a critical facet of 
structural power,
95
 its importance continues to grow as the use of credit-related 
instruments to fund activities become more prolific amongst all actors in the modern 
international system.  
Key changes to the structure of public and private finance have dramatically 
expanded the role of credit in the international system and enabled rating agencies to 
control knowledge and credit. For the purposes of this chapter, I shall focus on the 
growth in money supply and credit product issuance and the changes in the usage of 
credit by state actors. These trends have placed greater importance around the role of 
those who determine the direction of credit provision and the behaviour of credit 
recipients. Indeed, it is evident that the structural and relational power balance has 
shifted in favour of the rating agencies due to the growth of credit provisioning. The 
reorientation of the global economy toward a greater reliance on credit has been 
augmented by the precipitous growth of scale in the financial markets. Traded 
financial instruments that vary in complexity, from simple bond notes to highly 
geared derivatives, are used with increasing frequency to facilitate transactions 
throughout the modern international system.  
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These developments, when combined with disintermediation, have amplified 
the unique ability of rating agencies to generate much needed knowledge in the 
modern international system. This chapter shall provide an overview of the growth of 
credit in the modern international system and its emergence as a critical enabler of 
many basic tools of global governance. Such an overview will provide an empirical 
basis for further analysis of the role of knowledge in this new environment, the 
importance of structural and relational power shifts and the interactions between state 
actors and rating agencies in the twenty-first century. By gaining a better 
understanding of the systemic shifts in credit provisioning that have taken place in 
recent years, particularly relating to state actors, scholars are better able to assess the 
modern role of credit rating agencies and analyse the implications of this role on 
contemporary global governance.  
Why credit growth matters 
Credit relations have historically been influential on how governance 
functions. Mark Amen observed that credit is one of the many sites where people 
govern their social relations and that over time, credit relations have become 
abstracted and more opaque
.
.
96
 In this chapter, I will define credit as the lending of 
money, or the commitment to lend, to an individual or organisation for a defined 
period of time. While the scale and scope of international credit provision has grown 
significantly in recent times, its existence is not confined to modernity. Credit has 
flowed across geographic barriers to address funding needs over many centuries, as 
individuals or groups with a defined need have sought funding from external sources. 
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The provisioning of credit has taken place in various societies across many of the 
cultural and societal barriers that otherwise demonstrate the heterogeneous nature of 
human affairs. For example, in his paper in the Journal of the Economic and Social 
History of the Orient, Steven J. Garfinkle states that ‘credit transactions played an 
important role in the institutional and non-institutional economies of southern 
Mesopotamia at the end of the third millennium BC’.97 Garfinkle goes on to describe 
the complex credit market that operated in the region at the time, based around a 
variety of loans and commodities, including interest free loans and customary loans.
98
 
The credit environment described by Garfinkle is relatively sophisticated and plays a 
key role for the functioning of the wider economy.   
In different cultures at different times in history, the provisioning of credit is 
not only identifiable as a key activity around which affairs are organised, but also is 
reflective of the power that accompanies that control. This power has been obtained 
by a variety of actors, as the providers of credit have taken many forms. For example, 
R.H.C. Davis observed that until the end of the thirteenth century, the Fairs of 
Champagne were ‘the central clearing house of European trade and finance. Italian 
bankers sent agents who issued letters of credit that could be cashed in almost any 
stated currency and in any part of Europe’.99 Over many centuries, financiers, 
merchants and bankers have creatively sought ways to overcome political or 
geographic barriers to identify new recipients of credit. With such transactions came 
obligations on the part of borrowers. When describing how credit was transacted at 
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such fairs, R.D. Face noted that ‘every merchant had his agent, or perhaps several, to 
act in his place, to fulfil obligations, and in many cases to undertake news ones’.100  
The providers of credit at these medieval fairs communicated to borrowers a set of 
obligations that accompanied loans.  
Human interaction has long centred on the notion of engaging in various 
transactions to obtain items of need. The concept of exchange is embedded in history 
and built the foundation of exploration and travel that commenced the establishment 
of a global system. The providers of credit have long been able to attach conditions to 
loans, obtaining control over the actions of the borrower in the process. Credit’s 
historic role in the international system can be linked to its enabling function of a 
range of activities that otherwise may not take place because of inadequate capital. 
Borrowers fund activities in the near term that generate the requisite returns over the 
medium and long term to repay the loan and derive a direct commercial benefit. Given 
this enabling function, the providers of credit have possession of a resource, typically 
money, for which there is a perceived or real demand. This demand has facilitated 
authority to the providers of credit, as they are able to attach conditions to the loan 
and influence the activities of the borrower.  
MacDonald and Gastman have discussed the correlation between credit and 
power, noting ‘the wealth represented by credit augments political power’.101 They go 
on to liken credit to water, claiming credit is ‘a key wellspring of life – in this case 
economic life. Without credit, most businesses would find it difficult to function and 
                                                 
100
 R. D. Face, ‘Techniques of Business in the Trade between the Fairs of Champagne and the South of 
Europe in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries’, The Economic History Review, vol. 10, no. 3 (1958): 
427-438, p. 431. 
101
 A. L. Gastmann and S. B. MacDonald, A History of Credit and Power in the Western World (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001), p. 4. 
 52 
certainly many governments would be forced to scale down their operations and 
reduce expenditure’.102 From a global governance perspective, credit relations become 
important when they alter human behaviour on a significant scale in an organised and 
identifiable way.  
Credit relations have always provided context for how societies function and 
how one set of actors obtains and enforces control over another set of actors. These 
examples of structural and relational power structures have illuminated the state of 
global governance to varying degrees throughout history. However, what has changed 
over recent years is the expansion of credit’s role in the international system. The 
importance of credit has grown exponentially as more participants rely on credit to 
fund activities and its provision is now critical to state and non-state actors in the 
modern international system. The behaviour of numerous influential actors is now 
determined to a meaningful degree by the need to obtain credit. Credit relations are 
now a totemic factor in how human affairs are conducted across the globe. While this 
importance is not new, the scale of credit provisioning and its widespread usage for 
activities previously unlinked to credit has changed the scope of the dependence on 
credit and altered the structure of authority in the international system.  
This chapter is focussed on the global governance ramifications of the growth 
in importance of credit relations. As such, data will be used to illustrate the trend 
towards an increased reliance on credit by those conspicuous actors who play distinct 
roles in contemporary global governance. This analysis will not provide an exhaustive 
statistical overview of the credit growth. Of most relevance here is the growth in scale 
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of credit provisioning and the increased reliance on credit by actors who have 
previously enjoyed greater autonomy over their own financial affairs, most notably 
state actors. Changes in financial relationships have altered the global hierarchy by 
empowering the rating agencies to control the direction of credit, the behaviour of 
borrowers and the knowledge that creates the paradigm within which most actors now 
operate. From a global governance perspective, such a shift has profound 
ramifications on how human affairs are organised and conducted. Providing context to 
that recalibration of the global order enables scholars to more effectively assess the 
role of rating agencies in the modern international system.  
The scale of credit growth in the modern international system 
An important component of any analysis of the modern international system 
by political economists is the identification and interpretation of relevant economic 
data that provides evidence of shifts in global governance. In seeking to demonstrate 
the growth in the importance of credit in the contemporary global system, it is 
appropriate to sequentially demonstrate the scale and context of this growth by using 
global and country-specific data that provides an unambiguous illustration of a 
significant worldwide trend. Therefore, the growth in money supply, the growth in 
usage of credit products and the growth in usage of state-based credit products are 
used in this chapter to provide evidence that the contemporary use of credit in the 
modern international system far exceeds previous experiences. By demonstrating the 
scale of credit growth in the modern international system, the importance of 
knowledge and the contemporary role of credit rating agencies have perspective in an 
analysis of global governance.  
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One baseline method used to determine the scale of the overall growth of the 
demand and supply of credit across the international system is through observations of 
money supply, which is the amount of money in circulation in the global economy. 
When money supply increases, lending institutions are providing increased amounts 
of credit to public and private sector borrowers. When assessing money supply, the 
common benchmarks that are used are the M1 to M3 aggregates, as defined by the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States.  
M1 is defined as currency and demand deposits at commercial banks. M2 is 
the equivalent of M1 plus commercial bank savings and small time deposits, and M3 
is M2 plus deposits at mutual savings banks, savings and loans, and credit unions.
103
 
These monetary aggregates are important benchmarks for central bankers, other 
policy makers and observers of the international system who use the data to track 
trends in the amount of money in circulation. For scholars, the complexity and size of 
the modern financial system can create obstacles to obtaining an overview of trends 
relevant to global governance issues. Money supply provides an important and simple 
indicator of the prevalence of credit provisioning in the contemporary international 
system.  
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Data compiled by independent financial data agency Now and Futures shows 
that global M3 plus government debt plus credit grew from US$5 trillion in 1982 to 
over US$60 trillion in 2008.
104
 To provide historical context for this growth in money 
supply, it took an estimated eighty years for the same number to grow from $US1 
trillion to $US5 trillion.
105
 Importantly, according to the same source, money supply 
has essentially stabilised since the 2008 global financial crisis, rather than contracted 
in any sizable way. Observations of economic growth over a comparative timeframe 
show that money supply grew with the global economy. According to the IMF, the 
world’s gross domestic product grew from US$10.8 trillion to US$61.2 trillion 
between 1982 and 2008.
106
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Figure One
107
 
M3 Plus Credit Plus All Government Debt, Short Term 
  
To facilitate this growth in money supply and economic activity, the global 
financial system expanded its depth, reach, size and complexity over a comparable 
timeframe. The size of the finance sector has important consequences for how 
knowledge and power interplay with various actors in the contemporary international 
system. Most crudely, the increase in the scale of the financial markets can be 
illustrated in the market capitalisation of the world’s stock markets, as seen in Figure 
Two. Market capitalisation is an estimation of the value of a business that is obtained 
by multiplying the number of shares outstanding by the current price of a share for 
those companies listed on the stock exchange. While much of the growth in market 
capitalisation over this period can attributed to the corresponding bull market that 
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gripped the world’s stock markets, the floating on the stock exchange of previously 
state-owned enterprises in large developed markets also contributed to this sizeable 
global growth in market capitalisation.  
Figure Two
108
 
Global Market Capitalisation in Current US$ 
 
 The IMF definition of money supply differs slightly from that of the US 
Federal Reserve. The International Monetary Fund defines money supply as the total 
amount of money held by the non-bank public at a point in time. The International 
Monetary Fund also refers to this data as M1, which equates to physical currency and 
demand deposits, which are checking accounts. Regardless of the precise definition, 
M1 is a very liquid measure of the money supply, as it benchmarks the volume of 
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cash and assets that can quickly be converted to currency.
109
 Figure Three illustrates 
the growth in M1 over a similar timeframe to that used to track the growth of global 
share market capitalisation.  
Figure Three
110
 
 
Beyond data on money supply and market capitalisation lie a large number of 
indicators that inform observers of the international system about changes in the scale 
and complexity of the contemporary financial markets. One such indicator of 
considerable importance in the contemporary context is the use of credit products in 
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the modern international system. Of particular relevance is the emergence of 
derivatives. The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) defines a derivative as:  
a financial contract, the value of which depends on the value of one or more 
underlying reference assets, rates or indices. For analytical purposes, all 
derivatives contracts can be divided into basic building blocks of forward 
contracts, options or combinations thereof.
111
  
The contemporary credit market is dominated by the use of over the counter (OTC) 
derivatives. If a derivative is traded OTC, participants trade directly with each other, 
via the telephone or computer, rather than via an exchange.
112
 Given the identified 
importance of disintermediation, data relating to the usage of OTC derivatives provide 
observers with an indicator of the prevalence of credit products in contemporary 
global financial markets.  
The Bank for International Settlements’ data shows that the total amount of 
over the counter (OTC) single-currency interest rate derivatives outstanding (total 
contracts) on a global basis rose from US$42 trillion in June 1998 to US$458 trillion 
in the final quarter of 2008.
113
 According to the European Commission, this figure 
increased to $615 trillion by December 2009.
114
 Not only is the volume of derivative 
trading expanding on an extraordinary scale, but the pace of these financial 
transactions is also becoming more frenetic. The Bank of International Settlements’ 
triennial survey of the foreign exchange and derivatives market is based on data 
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provided by fifty-four central banks and monetary authorities. The April 2007 survey 
showed that the average daily turnover of OTC interest rate and non-traditional 
foreign exchange derivatives contracts had reached US$2.1 trillion, which was 71% 
higher than the previous survey in 2004.
115
 The BIS survey shows the sizeable growth 
in the scale and frequency of usage of derivate credit products in the contemporary 
global financial system.  
David Mengle, head of research at the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), sources the growth demand for credit derivatives to financial 
institutions seeking to diversify risk and those seeking a low cost means of taking on 
credit exposure.
116
 As illustrated in Figure Four the growth in outstanding credit 
derivatives expanded dramatically between 2004 and 2007.  
Figure Four
117
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Figure Four demonstrates the growth of credit derivatives according to two 
sources: the British Bankers Association (BBA) and the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA). While there is evidence that demand for some credit 
derivatives slowed in 2008 and 2009 as the global financial crisis took hold,
118
 any 
slowdown was only temporary. According to the ISDA, the growth in trade of OTC 
credit derivatives resumed in 2010.
119
 
Indeed, these instruments are now an integral component of the contemporary 
international system. For scholars seeking to gain a better understanding of the 
governance ramifications of this consequential surge in the use of credit products, 
securing a better understanding of the motives and underlying needs driving this 
growth is important. In his testimony to the US Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition and Forestry, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve observed that: 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives have come to play an exceptionally 
important role in our financial system and in our economy. These instruments 
allow users to unbundle risks and allocate them to the investors most willing 
and able to assume them. A growing number of financial and non-financial 
institutions have embraced derivatives as an integral part of their risk capital 
allocation and profit maximization.
120
  
This observation, from one of the global financial system’s informed observers, 
demonstrates that credit products are now a critical tools for various actors in the 
modern international system seeking to manage risk and improve returns. Both of 
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these outcomes are essential to the ability of state and non-state actors to effectively 
function.  
Derivatives enjoy their contemporary status due in part to their ability to 
provide a universal value on various financial products. Dick Bryan and Michael 
Rafferty propose that ‘derivatives provide a means to compare all different sorts of 
capital’ and that ‘the need for a universal measure of value … is what derivatives are 
enacting’.121 They go on to highlight their seminal role, based on the fact that ‘they 
are crucial to the link between money, price and fundamental value not because they 
actually determine fundamental values (for there are no truths here) but because they 
are the way in which the market judges or perceives fundamental value’.122 The scale 
of cross border capital flows and the size and complexity of the contemporary global 
financial markets places durable relevance on derivatives. Derivatives provide an 
immediate reflection of market sentiment and in doing so enable market participants 
to manage risk and optimise commercial returns. From a global governance 
perspective, the pace at which derivatives have transformed the modern financial 
system and the broader modern economy has fostered a deficit of understanding of the 
governance ramifications of this new paradigm.  
It is clear that modern credit provisioning has quickly moved away from a 
simple lender/borrower paradigm towards a larger number of largely anonymous 
actors using complex financial instruments on a much broader scale. Such instruments 
enable participants in the modern international system to customise each transaction 
to suit each specific set of commercial needs. This ability to tailor each product and 
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transaction to a specific set of commercial and risk variables creates a highly complex 
financial structure that lacks transparency. While derivatives help actors assign value, 
their trade over-the-counter does not help actors identify important trends in the 
financial system. 
Indeed, the ability of many actors to understand and influence global finance 
and the broader economic order is mitigated by the emergence of derivatives. 
Contemporary financial engineering creates challenges for traditional actors, 
particularly for states. The ability of traditional, state-based regulatory regimes to 
influence the operating environment for global credit provisioning has been 
undermined by the multilayered labyrinth that is the burgeoning international 
derivatives market. Because of the nature of many of the cross-border transactions 
undertaken in the modern credit market, state actors have limited capacity to monitor 
those credit transactions taking place partially or fully within their jurisdiction.  
This challenge for state actors is particularly acute for OTC derivatives. 
Bloomberg notes that the OTC market is ‘a decentralised market where 
geographically dispersed traders are linked by telephones and computer screens’.123  
Similarly, the European Commission has observed: 
Currently, there is little reliable information on what is going on in the OTC 
derivatives market. There are no public prices available, no public 
information as to who is entering deals with whom, over what period of time, 
relating to what underlying asset or for which amounts.
124
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The Commission goes on to note that 90% of the derivatives market is comprised of 
OTC derivatives.
125
 Given the volumes of derivative products being traded on a daily 
basis, the ability of state actors to even observe the scale of trading going on within 
their boundaries is now fundamentally compromised.  
From a global governance perspective, this shift is profound. Prior to the 
explosion of OTC derivatives in the global financial system, financial transactions 
were more concentrated in specific exchanges, providing greater transparency for 
state actors and international government organizations. With transparency came the 
ability to attempt to influence outcomes in specific markets. As highlighted by 
Comor, control over information flows is a determining factor behind any given 
authority structure in the global system.
126
 The European Commission has 
acknowledged that state actors have very limited capacity to obtain reliable 
information flows, yet alone control them, creating a governance vacuum that has 
been filled by credit rating agencies.  
At the same time as OTC derivatives have become an omnipresent force, both 
state and non-state actors have increased their usage of other, more traditional credit 
instruments.  One such instrument is a Collateralised Debt Obligation (CDO), which 
Bloomberg defines as a ‘general inclusive term which covers Collateralised Bond 
Obligations, Collateralised Loan Obligations and Collateralised Mortgage 
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Obligations’.127 According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA), private sector bond issuance increased dramatically in the 
2000’s before the 2008 financial crisis, as seen in Figure Five. 
Figure Five
128
 
Global CDO Issuance  
 
The significant growth in Collateralised Debt Obligation (CDO) issuance in 
the 2000’s provides another important indicator of quickly significant structural 
change can occur in the modern international system. It is evident that money supply 
and the use of credit products can now shift on an extraordinary scale over a short 
time period. Other indicators show that the impact of the global financial crisis on the 
broader growth of credit was only ephemeral. As illustrated in Figure Six, SIFMA’s 
data on US Corporate Bond Issuance shows activity soon recovered after a decline in 
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2008. More contemporary data shows that YTD, 2010 US Corporate Bond Issuance 
has grown by over 11% when compared to 2009.
129
  
Figure Six
130
 
US Corporate Bond Issuance 
 
The increasingly reliance on credit products by private actors is well 
documented. However, the breadth of this reliance across the modern international 
system is an important development for political economists. The trend towards a 
greater reliance on credit is also pervasive amongst state actors, who traditionally 
have been influential and relatively autonomous from other actors in the global 
system. For observers of the modern international system, any evidence that state 
actors have fundamentally altered their usage of credit products would provide 
important context on the role credit plays in enabling global governance and the 
ensuing trends in knowledge and power. State actors around the world have had a 
growing dependence on the use of government bonds and the issuance of other 
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securities to fund their operations. As shown in Figure Seven, according to the Bank 
of International Settlements, the use of international debt securities by governments in 
both the developed and developing world has expanded significantly over recent 
years.  
Figure Seven
131
 
International Debt Securities Issued by Governments in $USB  
– Global, Developed, Developing 
 
Between June 1995 and June 2010, the global amount of international debt 
securities issued by governments grew by 321%. In developed countries, debt security 
issuance rose over the same period by 367%, compared to 208% in developing 
countries. Tellingly, the growth in bond issuance by state actors continued during and 
after the 2008 global financial crisis. This growth in bond issuance reflects the growth 
of total central government debt. According to the OECD, total central government 
debt grew in member states grew from US$1.78 trillion in 1980 to $24.8 trillion in 
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2008, before easing back to $19.8 trillion in 2009.
132
 Represented graphically in 
Figure Eight, the scale of government debt becomes more apparent. OECD data also 
shows that central government debt, as a percentage of GDP, has remained relatively 
stable.  
Figure Eight 
Total Central Government Debt – OECD Nations 1980 - 2009  
 
State actors have become more reliant on debt instruments because of a 
shortfall that has emerged in their revenue streams. This shortfall is due to the well 
documented pursuit of liberal policy settings, particularly since the 1980’s, that have 
seen tax rates fall. State actors have become increasingly reticent to address revenue 
shortfalls through taxation. Data from twenty-five developed nations shows that total 
tax receipts as a percentage of GDP averaged 50.8% in 1997 and this figure fell to 
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47.2% in 2007.
133
 The same data source shows that total government expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP across twenty-seven developed nations fell over the same period 
from an average of 45.5% to 42.7%.
134
 The shortfall arises in the lag between tax 
receipts and state expenditure. Tax receipts generally occur in arrears, whereas 
expenditure is immediate. In 2006, for example, the average financial assets of 
general government across the same twenty-seven developed nations sat at 44% of 
GDP, while average liabilities for the general governments of these nations in the 
same year was 63.5%.
135
 The negative net worth of governments across the developed 
world was exacerbated by the 2008 global financial crisis. In response to the crisis, a 
large number of developed nations increased outgoing expenditure to prevent 
economic collapse.  
The measures pursued by policy makers in developed markets at this time 
included both rescue packages for specific private actors and stimulus measures for 
domestic economies, which experienced slowing growth in the face of financial 
uncertainty. In early 2010, the Board of the IMF noted that: 
on current trends, general government debt in advanced countries was 
expected to rise 36 percentage points of gross domestic product (GDP) during 
2007–2014 and that age-related (health and pension) expenditures would rise 
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by about 4-5 percentage points of GDP over the next 20 years, requiring a 
large adjustment to restore fiscal positions to more sustainable levels. In 
emerging economies, the outlook was more favourable, but adjustment would 
be needed here too.
136
  
Such an increase in general government debt is statistically significant and will ensure 
that state actors become even more dependent on utilising credit instruments to fund 
their activities.  
The growth in money supply, the growth in derivatives and the growth in 
usage of credit instruments by state actors have combined to dramatically increase the 
importance of credit in the international system. That growth is difficult to overstate. 
Figure Nine provides some historic perspective that is particularly relevant for 
political economists. The previous occasion credit experienced comparable growth 
was in the aftermath of the Great Depression, a time that saw significant shifts in 
global governance.  
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Figure Nine
137
 
  
The correlation between explosive credit growth and fundamental alterations 
to the international system is strong. While the changes experienced in the 1930s were 
more easily identified and monitored, the changes experienced in recent years are no 
less dramatic, despite their more opaque nature. Data is rarely presented in a way that 
so clearly illustrates systemic shifts in global finance. From the perspective of state 
actors, the trend to greater indebtedness is not new, although its scope and impact on 
the autonomy of state actors is. When viewed over a longer time period, the growth of 
money supply and government debt can be placed into a genuinely historic context.  
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Figure Ten
138
 
M3 Plus Credit Plus All Government Debt, Longer Term Charts 
 
As previously shown, the trend towards greater indebtedness is not restricted 
to developed states. State actors in emerging markets are also using debt instruments 
to fund activities with increasing frequency. For example, a Banque de France 
analysis of the of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (comprising of 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) 
showed there was a sixfold increase in the issuance of government securities between 
2001 and 2006.
139
  The need to obtain credit is now prevalent amongst state actors of 
varying degrees of development. While the data suggests that developed states are 
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more reliant on credit than developing states, the trend towards greater reliance is 
ubiquitous.  
The data presented in this chapter demonstrates clearly that both state and non-
state actors in the international system are increasingly dependent on the issuance of 
credit related products to fund their activities. Furthermore, the growing importance of 
credit provisioning has been accentuated in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial 
crisis. While credit has always played a role in influencing the activities of numerous 
actors in the international system, that role has evolved to the point where credit is 
now a critical enabler of global governance. Derivative products play a totemic role in 
assigning value to a wide range of products that are central to the functioning of the 
modern international system. Furthermore, state actors have lost their autonomy and 
are now reliant on the ebbs and flows of the international credit market to fund their 
activities.  
This chapter has also demonstrated that money supply and the broader global 
financial system has grown in size and complexity, diminishing the ability of state 
actors to accurately observe and control the financial markets. Within such an 
environment, those who are able to make sense of the exponential amount of data and 
other information available to market participants are destined to accumulate 
significant influence over those providing credit and those seeking credit to fund their 
activities in the international system. For political economists, observations on 
knowledge in the international system assist in understanding contemporary global 
governance. Both Strange and Comor, for example, have highlighted the importance 
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of the connection between knowledge and structural and relational power.
140
 This 
connection has more potency when that knowledge is determinant to the activities of 
most state and non-state actors in the international system.  
Given the genuinely global nature of the modern financial system, state and 
non-state actors require consistent, global sources of information on credit. The next 
chapter will demonstrate that credit rating agencies have comprehensively addressed 
this need. These agencies determine the behaviour of key actors in a prescriptive and 
unforgiving fashion. Indeed, a recalibration of structural power has taken place, with 
states losing control over credit, knowledge and beliefs, which combine to determine 
how the modern international system functions. From an IPE perspective, the shift in 
control of knowledge is of particular relevance. The scale and complexity of the 
global financial markets has dramatically increased the options available to the global 
investors who guide ever-growing pools of capital across state boundaries. As the 
scale of the global financial system has grown and technology evolved, the volume of 
information available has grown exponentially. In this highly competitive, highly 
complex and fast moving investment environment, demand for knowledge that is 
internationally recognised and respected has risen.   
Into this breach have marched the credit rating agencies. By assuming control 
over knowledge and creating consistent and easily recognisable global benchmarks, 
credit rating agencies have effectively harmonised their offering to the needs of the 
emerging paradigm. A new intersubjective consensus, to use Rosenau’s term, has 
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emerged.
141
 State and non-state actors are now guided in their investment activities to 
varying degrees by the knowledge controlled and communicated by credit rating 
agencies. Indeed, the new proclivity to rely on credit rating agencies to obtain and 
distribute knowledge has fundamentally altered contemporary global governance. 
Tony Porter’s observations on the rise of knowledge-producing epistemic 
communities provide a poignant reference point for contemporary political 
economists seeking to gain a better understanding of the modern power structure.
142
   
The shift in power is effectively illustrated through the development and 
distribution of knowledge on the creditworthiness of state actors by credit rating 
agencies. In the modern international system, these agencies are empowered to 
determine how investors view state actors and therefore influence to a significant 
extent the ability of state actors to fund their activities. State actors are no longer able 
to accumulate and distribute knowledge on their own creditworthiness in a credible 
way in the global investment community. Investors now question the objectivity and 
reliability of state-based knowledge. The Greek debt crisis provides scholars with a 
relevant example of this evolving dynamic. The role of knowledge and the ability of 
credit rating agencies to obtain and distribute knowledge to influence a broad range of 
actors shall be explored in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Three: 
The Role of Knowledge in Contemporary Financial Markets 
In the modern international system, the financial markets play a seminal role 
in global governance. As outlined in the previous chapter, the growth in scale of the 
global financial system in recent years has been dramatic. This growth has seen the 
development of a global financial infrastructure that can accommodate the explosion 
in money supply and the associated growth in the usage of complicated credit 
products, particularly derivatives. At the same, technological advances and the 
removal of barriers to cross border financial transactions have accelerated the 
emergence of a genuinely globalised financial system. With this new scale comes 
more complexity. The number of financial products available across porous state 
borders has significantly increased the options for would-be-borrowers and would-be-
lenders.  
A corollary of this development is a shift in the way actors seek knowledge to 
inform decision making, including investment decisions. The modern international 
system is a dynamic, interconnected and multifarious organism that has fundamentally 
new characteristics. The explosion of available information within that system is one 
such characteristic, permeating the activities and decisions of many actors, due largely 
to its scale. While many scholars and commentators acknowledge this development, it 
is a change in the global system that is challenging to quantify. However, research 
conducted by Lyman and Varian (fig. 11) effectively illustrates the pace and scope of 
the growth of information on a global scale. 
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Figure Eleven 
Worldwide Production of Original Information, if Stored Digitally, in Terabytes circa 
2002.
143
  
Storage Medium 2002 Terabytes 
Upper Estimate 
1999-2000 Upper 
Estimate 
% Change Upper 
Estimates 
Paper 1,634 1,200 36% 
Film 420,254 431,690 -3% 
Magnetic 4,999,230 2,779,760 80% 
Optical 103 81 28% 
TOTAL 5,421,221 3,212,731 69% 
 
Clearly, a profound growth in information is taking place in the modern 
international system. With so much information readily available, it is incumbent 
upon IPE scholars to consider the ramifications of this pervasive trend, particularly for 
global governance. Within the context of the global financial system, knowledge has 
become a powerful compass, guiding actors as they make decisions that regulate 
human affairs. In the twenty-first century, knowledge guides huge waves of capital to 
state and non-state actors via a range of financial instruments, including credit 
products. These waves of capital are the lifeblood of the contemporary global system, 
placing knowledge in a powerful and totemic role.  
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How knowledge is conceptualised is therefore important. This chapter will 
seek to highlight relevant theoretical concepts regarding the importance of knowledge 
and its use in contemporary global governance. This chapter will also seek to explore 
the accumulation of knowledge by the credit rating agencies and how these agencies 
use knowledge to influence the behaviour of a broad range of actors in the modern 
global system. These observations will provide the foundation for an analysis of 
specific examples of the influence of credit rating agencies on contemporary global 
governance in the following chapters. Knowledge plays a pivotal role in the influence 
exerted by credit rating agencies. A deliberate evaluation of the theoretical and 
practical positioning of knowledge in the modern system augments an enhanced 
understanding of the role of credit rating agencies in contemporary global governance. 
Knowledge is different to information. Knowledge effectively distils 
information and provides widely accepted contextual frameworks around which 
participants in the global system can interpret information and make choices. This 
process engenders authority for the originator, who is able to claim access to 
knowledge that is to some degree exclusive. This process can also be subjective. Such 
authority can be amplified when there is broad acceptance of contextual frameworks 
created by knowledge. Information by itself has limited capacity to influence the 
behaviour of actors in the contemporary global system. Rather, it is the frameworks 
and structures provided by knowledge that shape human affairs on a global basis.  
The distinction between information and knowledge represents a logical 
starting point for an assessment of the positioning of knowledge in the modern 
international system. Edward Comor has observed that knowledge is represented by 
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‘how human beings sort and process information into what is known’ through a 
‘complex set of conceptual systems’. 144 As outlined in Chapter One, Comor has 
argued that ‘information in and of itself is meaningless with the presence of 
conceptual systems that facilitate particular understandings and applications’.145 
Indeed, the volume of information available in the modern international system 
elevates the importance of such conceptual systems. As previously noted, Jan 
Toporowski has made similar observations relating to the importance of knowledge 
structures in global finance due to the permanent buzz of new information.
146
  
James Rosenau has described the emergence of information technology as an 
‘information revolution’ that is both ‘powerful and neutral’.147 Rosenau draws a clear 
distinction between information and information technology, noting that ‘information 
is perforce subjective and anything but neutral. It can be skewed and designed to 
distort. This is not the case, however, with information technologies’.148 Indeed, using 
Rosenau’s distinction, information technology provides a powerful platform that 
enables those who create and enforce knowledge structures to quickly distil enormous 
volumes of information into relatable and usable constructs. Information technology 
has facilitated the emergence of a highly responsive global financial system that can 
react quickly to research and assessments generated by globally recognised providers 
of knowledge such as credit rating agencies.  
Participants in the modern global financial system have access to 
extraordinary volume of information generated by a broad range of actors including 
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companies, analysts, financial and industry media and states. Information relating to 
variables such as earnings, forecasts, industry peers, regulatory changes, sectoral and 
macroeconomic trends flood the twenty-first century financial system through 
information technology platforms. For observers of contemporary global governance, 
the complexity of conceptual systems described by Comor are evident in the 
knowledge generated by the ratings agencies. These actors produce a plethora of 
globally recognised rating measures, as illustrated in Figure Twelve.    
Figure Twelve
149
 
 
These ratings have become synonymous with the financial health of state and 
non-state actors and are a veritable proxy for global market consensus. However, the 
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contemporary conceptual systems created by the rating agencies now extend well 
beyond rating assessments. Christina Bannier and Christian Hirsch have noted that:  
the widespread use of credit ratings has been accompanied by a rise in the 
complexity of the rating information. Most credit rating agencies not only 
offer a rating ...but supplement their service by providing additional 
information via rating outlooks and rating reviews (watchlists) that give 
indications of future credit rating changes.
150
  
Timothy Sinclair has also drawn attention to this growth in innovation by the credit 
rating agencies, observing that ‘derivatives and structured financing, among other 
things, have stressed existing analytical systems and outputs, and the agencies have 
been developing new rating scales and expertise in response’.151  
By deepening their offering beyond ratings, credit rating agencies are able to 
further differentiate the knowledge they generate from the financial information that is 
available to market participants and observers. The broader offering also enables the 
credit rating agencies to engage with increased frequency with both the entities they 
are rating and those who acquire the knowledge they produce. The technical attributes 
of the ratings process are well documented. However, for scholars with an interest in 
contemporary global governance, an understanding of how credit rating agencies 
accumulate and use knowledge to exert influence over a range of actors has 
significant value. The integration of linear ratings with more subjective analysis, 
outlooks and reviews, as described by Bannier and Hirsch, is conducive to the 
establishment of conceptual systems that help generate pervasive norms in the modern 
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international system. These norms help actors quickly sift through voluminous 
information and reach a consensus on what is known and what that means.   
As outlined in the previous chapter, the volume of financial transactions and 
financial instruments has grown markedly over a relatively short period of time. 
However, the challenges facing participants in the global financial system extend well 
beyond scale. James Crotty has noted that ‘financial innovation has proceeded to the 
point where important structured financial products are so complex that they are 
inherently non-transparent’.152 The intricacies of modern finance are not only 
multiplied by the complexities of the financial products themselves, but also by the 
increasingly convoluted commercial relationships that transact their exchange. In a 
Bank of International Settlements (BIS) working paper, Hyun Song Shin observed ‘a 
characteristic feature of financial intermediation based on the US-securitisation 
system is the long chains financial intermediaries involved in channelling funds from 
the ultimate creditors to the ultimate borrowers’.153 Shin draws attention to the trend 
in contemporary finance away from a short intermediation chain, where a borrower 
lends from a bank which derives its funding from depositors, towards long 
intermediation chains. These long intermediation chains include several financial 
institutions and products between the borrower and the depositor.
154
  
Longer intermediation chains, combined with disintermediation and increasing 
complexity, create opacity for participants and observers in global finance, who are 
seeking greater clarity on investment choices. As highlighted in Chapter One, 
                                                 
152
 James Crotty, ‘Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the ‘New 
Financial Infrastructure’,’ Cambridge Journal of Economics 33 (2009): 563-580, p. 566.  
153
 Hyun Song Shin, ‘Financial Intermediation and the Post-Crisis Financial System’, Bank of 
International Settlements Working Paper 304 (2010): 1-38, p. 2. 
154
 Idem.  
 83 
Timothy Sinclair see disintermediation as an important precursor to the emergence of 
epistemic authorities such as ratings agencies, who homogenise belief systems 
through a process they describe as cognitive centralisation.
155
 Mark Amen has also 
noted that ‘abstract credit relations increase the likelihood that the hierarchical setting 
in which knowledge is exchanged will itself affect the distribution of power’.156 This 
abstraction has increased as the size and scale of global finance have increased.  
The challenges associated with navigating the global financial system foster 
the growing reliance on the interpretations and assessments of recognised knowledge 
providers. Indeed, the many participants involved in the long intermediation chains 
described by Shin, including money market funds, commercial banks, securities firms, 
issuer and mortgage pool funds, are all potential suppliers of information regarding a 
typical financial transaction.
157
 For actors seeking clarity and consistency across 
sectors and markets, the need for a homogenous, recognisable and accepted set of 
conceptual systems is acute. As Timothy Sinclair has noted, ‘the authority of rating 
agencies has expanded with the growth of capital markets and the decline of banks as 
major allocators of resources’.158  
In the absence of the conceptual systems described by Comor,
159
 the global 
financial markets’ ability to interpret information would likely drown in a sea of 
seemingly unrelated data. State and non-state actors are now highly reactive to the 
global financial markets, which themselves are effectively structured around the 
distillation of information. As Langohr and Langohr have observed, ‘it is a truism that 
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securities markets are actually information markets’ and that ‘one of the most critical 
impediments to investor rights is their ignorance of what goes on in a company, i.e., 
the information asymmetry between outside investors and insiders who control 
company operations’.160 This information asymmetry is present at a broader scale in 
financial instruments relating to currencies, sovereign debt and commodities. The 
driving need to distil information empowers those actors who are able to credibly 
claim an ability to illuminate the commercial and financial realities that are so 
relevant to the decision making of participants in the financial markets.  
Given the critical role knowledge plays in influencing the actions of various 
actors, any changes to the access to and demand for that knowledge will have 
significant implications on the international system. This demand brings Susan 
Strange’s delineation between relational and structural power into focus. Strange 
observed that structural power ‘confers the power to decide how things shall be done, 
the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to 
people or corporate enterprises’.161 Numerous participants in global finance scattered 
across disparate locations influence the behaviour of actors through the assessments 
and decisions they make. The credit rating agencies codify their assessments of the 
credit-worthiness of actors through their ratings, which provide globally recognised 
and accepted benchmarks that guide a range of important decisions by state and non-
state actors alike. Collectively, this influence constructs the overarching system that 
regulates human affairs on a global basis. Such power therefore is not relational, but 
structural.  
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Strange cites the control of knowledge and control of credit as being two 
integral sources of structural power. In particular, she attributes the ability to 
influence the activities of actors through less visible means as being a critical 
component to the importance of knowledge in the global system.
162
  Indeed, Strange 
observes that control of knowledge provides a ‘very special kind of structural 
power’.163 This power is derived from the structure of knowledge itself. According to 
Strange, ‘a knowledge structure determines what knowledge is discovered, how it is 
stored, and who communicates it by what means to whom and on what terms’.164 
Importantly, Strange also noted that ‘power and authority are conferred on those 
occupying key decision-making positions in the knowledge structure’ and ‘those who 
are acknowledged by society to be possessed of the ‘right’, desirable knowledge and 
engaged in the acquisition of more of it, and on those entrusted with its storage, and 
those controlling in any way the channels by which knowledge, or information, is 
communicated’.165 In a modern setting, such authority requires the acknowledgement 
and acceptance of a significant number of disparate actors.  
The epistemic nature of the structural power, as described by Strange, provides 
a useful context for an analysis of the role of credit rating agencies in contemporary 
global governance. Using the criteria above, it is clear that in the modern international 
system the credit rating agencies, perhaps more than any other actor, exhibit the traits 
highlighted by Strange attributable to the creation of a knowledge structure. These 
organisations are able to determine to a significant extent what knowledge is 
discovered, how it is processed, how it is communicated and most importantly, to 
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whom it is communicated to. In an era when the scale and complexity of the global 
financial markets extends well beyond the institutional capacity of any single state 
actor, the credit rating agencies effectively control the rules that guide the 
conspicuous and inconspicuous decisions that guide human affairs. The recognition 
and authority they carry enables credit rating agencies to employ structural power on 
an impressive scale.   
In The New Masters of Capital (2005), Timothy Sinclair draws attention to the 
role of state-based financial regulation in the reinforcement of the epistemic authority 
of credit rating agencies. For example, Sinclair documents a plethora of regulatory 
measures in OECD and APEC countries that force market participants to use the 
credit ratings system.
166
 In New Zealand, for instance, a registered bank is required by 
legislation to disclose ratings in its quarterly disclosure statement, while in Argentina, 
banks and financial companies must seek a rating from an authorised rating agency.
167
 
In Malaysia, no private debt securities can be issued unless they are rated BBB or 
higher for long term debt.
168
  
Such state-based regulatory reinforcement is supplemented by international 
financial regulation. As previously discussed, the third of the Basel Accords, known 
as Basel III, represent the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s response to the 
2008 global financial crisis. Basel III is emerging as the new global regulatory 
standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity through which the Basel Committee 
have sought to address the reliance on ratings generated by the credit rating agencies 
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in Basel II.
169
 Basel III explicitly recognises the global banking system’s ‘reliance on 
external credit ratings’, yet seeks to explore ways to compel banks to more 
transparently assess the credit risks associated with exposures.
170
  
The answer, according to the Basel Committee, is the incorporation of the 
International Organisation of Securities Commission’s (IOSCO) Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for credit rating agencies. Basel III recommends changing the text of 
Basel II, paragraph ninety to read ‘national supervisors are responsible for 
determining on a continuous basis whether an external credit assessment institution 
(ECAI) meets the criteria ... national supervisors should refer to the IOSCO’s Code of 
Conduct Fundamentals for credit rating agencies when determining ECAI 
eligibility’.171 
Basel III is likely to reinforce the role of the credit rating agencies in the 
global banking system, albeit with additional scrutiny courtesy of IOSCO’s Code of 
Conduct Fundamentals. Other international organisations with an oversight of the 
global financial system also recognise the importance of credit rating agencies in the 
provision of knowledge. The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Global Financial 
Stability Report: Sovereigns, Funding, and Systemic Liquidity (2010), acknowledged 
the need for aggregating information about the credit quality of various actors in the 
global financial system, noting that credit rating agencies allow ‘borrowers to access 
global and domestic markets and attract investment funds, thereby adding liquidity to 
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markets that would otherwise be illiquid’.172 International financial regulation echoes 
the importance placed on the credit ratings system by state regulators in developed 
and developing markets. Such regulatory measures legitimise the claims by the credit 
rating agencies that they have a percipient ability to create the knowledge structures 
that are needed in the global financial system.  
The location of such structural power may not be easily recognised by many 
due to the less visible means used to exert influence, as described by Strange in States 
and Markets (1988).
173
 Where knowledge is derived and communicated is critical to 
the construct of power structures and how influence is exerted. Mark Amen notes that 
‘although knowledge is finite, it is also firmly in place at sites of governance to which 
people come…people can submit to a process of learning, conform to what is 
expected of them, and even change their activities to comply with the norms’.174 In a 
modern context, global finance is an important site of governance to which various 
actors come as they seek funding for their activities. The compliance by state and non-
state actors to the ratings system reflects a powerful conformity to the norms, as 
prescribed by the credit rating agencies. The process of learning described by Amen is 
illustrated in the analysis the credit rating agencies use to accompany ratings 
decisions. Indeed, the broadened offering from the rating agencies has a distinctly 
educative quality, with rating agency analysts happy to narrate their decisions via the 
media, as discussed in Chapter One, to ensure actors understand the rationale behind 
decisions. The acceptance by so many actors of the credence of the ratings system 
creates a powerful enforcement mechanism.  
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Another enforcement mechanism that strengthens the positioning of the 
knowledge structure generated by judgements around credit is the market reaction to 
decisions and statements from the credit ratings agencies. The financial markets 
swiftly react to new knowledge, in the form of a ratings decision, analysis or 
commentary from a ratings agency, repeatedly reinforcing the market consensus that 
the ratings agencies are the source of accurate assessments on the financial health of 
various actors and the likely moves of key decision makers. There are a plethora of 
examples of this dynamic. In March 2011, Standard and Poor’s cut its credit rating of 
Japanese motoring giant Toyota from AA to AA-, triggering a swift reaction by 
investors. Toyota shares fell 1.3% within hours of the credit rating decision.
175
 
Standard and Poor’s analyst Chizuko Satsukawa explained the decision by saying, 
‘the company’s profitability is still weak, its pace of recovery is slower than those of 
Japanese peers, and its profitability might remain under pressure from higher raw 
material prices and gasoline prices as well as the strong yen’.176 Toyota spokesperson 
Mike Michels said ‘the downgrade by S&P is regrettable and we do not take this 
rating change lightly’.177 Mr Michels went on to say ‘we aim to improve our rating by 
making the best management decisions we can, while continuing to take care of our 
customers as our top priority. This will help us improve our profitability over the long 
term’.178  
The Toyota example provides a good case study of the enforcement 
mechanism at play with credit rating agencies. A credit rating agency downgrades a 
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company’s rating and publicly releases a statement that provides both the rationale for 
the decision and outlines the steps for possible improvement by the rated entity. The 
market reacts negatively, wiping significant value from the rated entity in response. 
The rated entity subsequently releases a contrite statement, pledging to address the 
issues raised by the rating agency.  
Examples of credit rating news trumping operational or commercial 
fundamentals are also commonplace. The intraday volatility of BP’s share price 
during the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico represents a poignant example of this 
dynamic. On 3 June 2010, BP’s share price rallied ‘3.7 per cent on news that robot 
submarines attempting to curb the spill made some progress’.179 However, later that 
day, Fitch announced it had lowered BP’s credit rating from AA+ to AA. In a 
statement, Fitch said ‘The downgrade of BP’s ratings reflects Fitch’s opinion that 
risks to both BP’s business and financial profile continue to increase following the 
Deepwater Horizon accident in the US Gulf of Mexico’.180 BP shares fell dramatically 
on news of the credit rating downgrade, ending the day down 0.7%.
181
 Investors, who 
were originally bullish on operational progress being made by the company as it 
sought to manage the oil spill, clearly prioritised the assessment of a credit rating 
agency over BP’s own analysis.  
A unique component to the enforcement mechanism attached to credit rating 
assessments is its scale. Changes to sovereign ratings can have a broad market impact. 
For example, in May 2010, Fitch downgraded Spain’s sovereign debt one notch from 
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triple-A to AA+ due to its economic growth outlook, triggering a remarkable chain of 
events on the global financial markets. The downgrade saw the euro fall precipitously 
against the US dollar, with the European currency falling almost a cent in the minutes 
after the announcement, while in New York, the S&P dropped 1.1% on the news.
 182
 
The response to that particular credit rating decision in the financial markets was fast, 
global and decisive. This case study again demonstrates the supremacy of credit rating 
assessments over other developments in the minds of investors. The day before the 
Fitch downgrade, Spain’s Socialist government won parliamentary approval for a 
tough austerity plan, involving €15bn of budget cuts through a 5% cut in public sector 
pay, a freeze on pensions and other cuts to government spending.
183
 Such significant 
state-specific political news was unable to inoculate various markets from the fallout 
of a credit rating downgrade the next day.  
Cognitive learning means that participants in the global financial markets are 
highly responsive to knowledge generated by the credit rating agencies. The 
complexity of the contemporary rating system described by Bannier and Hirsch means 
there is an almost continuous stream of information emanating from the rating 
agencies that potentially influence the markets. In addition, speculation about future 
changes to rating agency assessments is commonplace, particularly amongst those 
involved in market research. The growing prevalence of rating watches fosters such 
speculation and helps to sustain the knowledge structure rating agencies provide. 
Indeed, the statements released by credit rating agencies do little to dispel market 
ruminations, creating a symbiotic cycle of dependence.  
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For example, in December 2010, Moody’s announced a two-notch downgrade 
of Hungary’s sovereign rating to Baa3, one notch above junk, with a negative 
outlook.
184
 Dietmar Hornung, Vice President and Senior Credit Officer at Moody’s 
Sovereign Risk Group told reporters that the negative outlook ‘speaks to the next 12-
18 months ... we are monitoring the situation but negative outlooks (don’t mean) an 
imminent rating action to be expected’.185 The market interpretation of the 
ramifications of the Moody’s announcement was less ambiguous. Timothy Ash, Head 
of Global Emerging Markets Research at the Royal Bank of Scotland said that 
following the downgrade, there was ‘a clear risk’ that at some time in the next year, 
Hungary would lose its investment grade status.
186
 Emerging market analysts at TD 
Securities, a significant global financial and investment consultancy, asserted that ‘the 
risk for further downgrades should trigger a risk-off reaction adverse to Hungarian 
assets’.187 This example demonstrates the reinforcement mechanisms in-built in the 
credit rating process. Credit rating agencies use mechanisms like credit outlooks and 
credit watches to tantalise market participants through the spectre of future action 
within a broad time horizon that could have a material impact on prices. Such 
mechanisms sustain ongoing interest in the deliberations of the credit rating agencies, 
creating a never ending process of assessment with little prospect for closure or long 
term certainty. 
The interplay between the rating agencies and the financial markets represent a 
unique and omnipresent reinforcement mechanism for the knowledge structure 
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assiduously built by the credit rating agencies. The reinforcement mechanism is 
unique because a broad range of actors can be materially impacted on the global 
financial markets within minutes of new knowledge being created by the credit rating 
agencies. It is challenging to identify a contemporary knowledge structure that can 
boast a reinforcement mechanism that has comparable potency. This knowledge 
structure occupies the entire length of Rosenau’s continuum of global governance,188 
with formal rules one end in the form of credit rating decisions and a less formal set of 
norms at the other in the form of market expectations and reactions.   
The atypical nature of this structural power is material to the impactful 
capabilities of this select group of influencers. As outlined in the previous chapter, 
state and non-state actors need to interact with global finance to facilitate access to the 
capital required to fund their activities. Importantly, the globalised nature of the 
contemporary international system has compromised the ability of state actors to 
exclusively obtain and disseminate knowledge that will establish expectations and 
guide behaviour. There is now a fundamental dislocation, as noted by Rodrik, ‘in a 
world where national markets are fully integrated yet politics remains organised 
nationally’.189 State actors no longer have the capacity to control the modern 
knowledge generation process.  
The exclusivity of the rating agencies’ knowledge offering is no accident. 
These entities have carefully cultivated their monopoly over knowledge generation 
and dissemination in the modern international system. Exclusivity of knowledge is a 
key claim of the rating agencies. Rating agencies unambiguously promote the concept 
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that they are uniquely positioned to provide the structural knowledge that participants 
in the global financial system need. Indeed, they clearly distinguish the knowledge 
they generate from the less valuable information available from other sources.  
These themes are consistently highlighted through the promotional activities 
of each of the three major credit rating agencies. For example, Standard and Poor’s 
claims to ‘provide investors who want to make better informed investment decisions 
with market intelligence in the form of credit ratings, indices, investment research and 
risk evaluations and solutions’.190 Moody’s describe themselves as ‘an essential 
component of the global capital markets’,191 and go on to claim, ‘our independent and 
objective opinions contribute to transparent financial markets and provide an 
insightful view on credit quality to investors and issuers worldwide’.192 Meanwhile, 
Fitch’s definition of its services reveal the exclusivity positioning that is so central to 
the contemporary global power structure. As their website states: ‘Offering a world of 
knowledge and experience behind every opinion, we transform information to deliver 
meaning and utility to investors, issuers and other market participants….the additional 
context, perspective and insights we provide help investors make important credit 
judgments with confidence’.193 
Rosenau’s concept of intersubjective consensus becomes more relevant when 
one considers that the process of knowledge generation at credit rating agencies 
brings together skills that are not ostensibly unique. In testimony to the United States 
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(US) Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs’ Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, Frank Raiter, Managing Director at Standard and 
Poor’s between 1995 and 2005, provided US Senators with an overview of how rating 
agencies develop their ratings for corporate entities. His testimony included the 
following observation:  
Traditional credit analysis looks at financial ratios, business practices, 
products, markets and management and a myriad of other factors. In rating 
corporate bonds a committee, made up of analysts from the same industry as 
well as analyst from associated industries, reviews the rating proposal and 
analysis and the committee vote is a significant factor in establishing a 
published rating.
194
  
Other entities, such as accounting firms, advisory firms, banks, investment banks, 
brokerage houses and regulators have analysts who compile information on issues like 
products, markets, management, financial ratios and business practices.  
 It is the establishment of globally recognised benchmarks that have empowered 
credit rating agencies and differentiated their offering from that of other entities. The 
internationalisation of finance has created an acute need for globally understood 
standards that enable borrowers, lenders and traders to make assessments based on 
universally acknowledged benchmarks. The credit rating agencies were ahead of the 
curve, establishing a homogenous, global set of benchmarks well before globalization 
reshaped international finance. Standard and Poor’s traces its history back to 1860,195 
while Moody’s was established in 1900.196 Even the youngest of the big three credit 
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rating agencies, Fitch Ratings, was established in 1913.
197
 This first mover advantage 
enabled them to assume a central position in the emerging global system. The 
knowledge structure they have established has provided the standardisation of 
financial assessments that is in demand amongst borrowers and lenders alike. As 
Langohr and Langohr note, ‘credit ratings shorten the distance between lenders and 
borrowers because they satisfy needs on both sides’.198  
 From a finance perspective, standardisation has important ramifications. In a 
working paper for the Bank of International Settlements, Claudio Borio observed that 
‘what can be measured, can be priced. And what can be priced, if sufficiently 
standardised, can also be traded’.199 Indeed, the ratings agencies actively promote the 
consistency of the ratings they produce. In a Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff 
Report, Adam Ashcraft and Til Schuermann highlight a Moody’s presentation given 
by Frederic Drevon in May 2004 which states that ‘the comparability of these 
opinions holds regardless of the country of the issuer, is industry, asset class, or type 
of fixed-income debt’.200 By way of further illustration, Ashcraft and Schuermann 
draw attention to a Standard and Poor’s document from May 2007 which argues that 
‘our ratings represent a uniform measure of credit quality globally and across all types 
of debt instruments.  In other words, an ‘AAA’ rated corporate bond should exhibit 
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the same degree of credit quality as an ‘AAA’ rated securitized debt issue’.201 The 
desire of credit rating agencies to highlight the standardised nature of the knowledge 
they produce is unambiguous.  
 The credit rating agencies clearly understand the link between consistent global 
benchmarks, the knowledge structure and authority in the modern international 
system. This understanding is reflected in Moody’s articulation of their mission as ‘to 
be the world’s most respected authority serving credit-sensitive markets’.202 The 
selection of the word ‘authority’ as part of its core mission is revealing. The Concise 
Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘authority’ as ‘(1) the power or right to give orders 
and enforce obedience (2) a person or organisation exerting control in a political or 
administrative sphere (3) the power to influence others based on recognised 
knowledge or expertise’.203 The use of the word ‘authority’ is a deliberate attempt by 
Moody’s to position its offering as a source of direction for the modern international 
system, based on recognised knowledge and capabilities. Such lofty aspirations 
emphatically link knowledge with structural power in contemporary global 
governance.  
 In the early years of the twenty-first century, the volume of information 
available to actors has exceeded the ability of most actors to comprehend its meaning 
and make informed judgments. Lengthening intermediation chains and 
disintermediation are accentuating the growth in complexity of the global financial 
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markets that invariably accompanies the growth in scale. In this environment, 
knowledge, as Williams and O’Brien have argued, plays a seminal role in ‘the 
overarching system which regulates human affairs on a global basis’.204 It is 
knowledge that enables actors to navigate the modern international system. It is 
knowledge that creates the frameworks around which actors structure their affairs. 
Moreover, it is knowledge that guides the massive flows of credit around the world. 
Thus, Susan Strange’s attribution of ‘a very special kind of structural power’ to 
knowledge and ‘power and authority’ to ‘those occupying key decision-making 
positions in the knowledge structure’, provides scholars with a relevant theoretical 
vantage point from which the contemporary role of credit rating agencies is 
clarified.
205
  
 Credit rating agencies are globally recognised as authoritative sources of 
knowledge. These actors actively leverage this recognition to affirm their positioning 
within the global system. Contemporary global governance is determined, to a large 
degree, by the interplay between the credit rating agencies and other actors, including 
private corporations and states. This interplay is centered on the way credit rating 
agencies use knowledge to influence behavior. The historical importance of state 
actors in global governance makes the exchange of knowledge between states and 
credit rating agencies a particularly poignant juncture to explore the shifting power 
structure that shapes human affairs on a global scale.  
 While the relationship between credit rating agencies and state actors has been 
explored, such analysis has typically focused on linear, cause and effect observations. 
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The plethora of ancillary services being offered above and beyond credit ratings 
provides greater scope for interpretation, analysis and subjectivity of the part of the 
credit rating agencies. When analysing a knowledge structure, Susan Strange has 
highlighted the importance of ‘what knowledge is discovered, how it is stored, and 
who communicates it by what means to whom and on what terms’.206 Given the scope 
for how credit rating agencies reach conclusions, make assessments and influence 
actors beyond of the parameters of the credit rating scores, it is incumbent upon 
modern IPE scholars to seek a greater understanding of the interplay between credit 
rating agencies and state actors. Beyond the assessment-reaction dynamic lies an 
opaque layer of formal and informal engagement that is material to the actions of both 
states and credit rating agencies. This engagement is not between two equal parties. 
As outlined in this chapter, credit rating agencies have carefully cultivated their 
unique role in the provision of knowledge, with powerful in-built reinforcement 
mechanisms established through the global financial markets. 
 Such interactions ricochet down both ends of Rosenau’s continuum of global 
governance, with formal, rules-based engagement and informal, normative 
discussions creating a challenging dynamic to observe. Many of these interactions 
take place away from the glare of voter or investor scrutiny. Yet these interactions are 
critical to contemporary global governance. The first decade of the twenty-first 
century has seen numerous examples of states shifting policy settings to accommodate 
the overt or implied expectations of credit rating agencies. The accumulation and 
decimation of knowledge plays a critical role in that process. For scholars seeking a 
greater understanding of the role of credit rating agencies in contemporary global 
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governance, exploring the interactions between state actors and credit rating agencies 
will provide improved comprehension of the modern international system.               
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Chapter Four: A One-Sided Conversation 
The process of knowledge generation lies at the epicentre of contemporary 
global governance. Edward Comor identified the generation of knowledge as being 
the processing of information into what is ‘known’ through a ‘complex set of 
conceptual systems’.207 The generation of knowledge around the creditworthiness of 
state actors provides a powerful demonstration of the location of authority in the 
modern international system. States, credit rating agencies and market participants are 
all actively seeking to create knowledge relating to this sensitive and heavily 
scrutinised component of the financial system. The creditworthiness of state actors is 
increasingly a contested subject. As external observers, credit rating agencies 
typically need to engage with states to obtain information and feedback to assist in 
their own deliberations. For IPE scholars, understanding how states and credit rating 
agencies engage amidst a contested knowledge generation environment provide 
signposts on how credit rating agencies influence contemporary global governance.  
The unique nature of sovereign actors means that assessments on their 
creditworthiness require a process of discovery by the credit rating agencies. The 
nature of sovereign entities makes that discovery process and the ensuing assignment 
of credit ratings challenging. Unlike corporate actors, it is difficult for states to be 
grouped according to key characteristics, reducing the effectiveness of peer 
comparators. Whereas every listed entity adheres to a predictable reporting calendar 
according to the listing rules of the relevant stock exchange, the disclosure 
requirements of state actors differ markedly, depending on unpredictable variables 
such as domestic budgetary processes, the freedom of the media, political disclosure 
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conventions and regulatory scrutiny over the decision making process. Many of these 
variables are also susceptible to cultural subjectivity. 
Another complicating factor is that the actions of state actors are guided by 
political, as well as economic considerations, creating complex and at times byzantine 
policy making environments. For knowledge providers who pride themselves on 
establishing globally consistent benchmarks, this heterogeneous class of actors can 
present formidable opacity. Langohr and Langohr note that ‘the nature of sovereign 
ratings involves the use of a whole range of qualitative factors added to a variety of 
quantitative indicators’.208 It is the use of these qualitative factors that provoke these 
authors to observe that ‘sovereign ratings are even less of an exact science than a 
corporate bond rating’.209  
The unique nature of sovereign entities differentiates the discovery process 
undertaken by credit rating agencies. While these knowledge providers use rating 
committees to determine the creditworthiness of sovereign actors through 
assessments, scores and ultimately ratings, there are important distinguishing features 
to this influential process. All three credit rating agencies publicly acknowledge the 
need for a different approach via the unique methodology they deploy to undertake 
sovereign credit ratings. According to Standard and Poor’s, five key areas form the 
foundation for their sovereign credit analysis: political, economic, external, fiscal and 
monetary considerations.
210
 Standard and Poor’s breaks down these areas as follows: 
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Figure Thirteen
211
 
Area Factors Captured 
The Political Score  The effectiveness, stability, and predictability of the 
sovereign’s policymaking and political institutions 
(primary factor). 
 The transparency and accountability of institutions, 
data, and processes, as well as the coverage and 
reliability of statistical information (secondary factor). 
 The government’s payment culture (potential 
adjustment factor). 
 External security risks (potential adjustment factor). 
 The potential effect of external organisations on policy 
settings (potential adjustment factor). 
The Economic Score  Income levels. 
 Growth prospects. 
 Economic diversity and volatility. 
The External Score  The status of a sovereign’s currency in international 
transactions. 
 The country’s external liquidity, which provides an 
indication of the economy’s ability to generate the 
foreign exchange necessary to meet its public-and 
private-sector obligations to non-residents. 
 The country’s external indebtedness, which shows 
resident’s assets and liabilities (in both foreign and 
local currency) relative to the rest of the world.  
The Fiscal Score  Sustainability of a sovereign’s deficits and debt 
burden, considering fiscal flexibility, long-term fiscal 
trends and vulnerabilities, debt structure and funding 
access, and potential risks arising from contingent 
liabilities.  
The Monetary Score  The sovereign’s ability to use monetary policy to 
address domestic economic stresses, particularly 
through its control of money supply and domestic 
liquidity conditions. 
 The credibility of monetary policy, as measured by 
inflation trends.  
 The effectiveness of mechanisms for transmitting the 
effect of monetary policy decision to the real economy, 
largely a function of the depth and diversification of 
the domestic financial system and capital markets.  
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Tellingly, Standard and Poor’s provide a glossary of key indicators used in 
their sovereign rating methodology, covering off each area of scoring, with the 
important exceptions of the political and monetary scores. The above table exhibits 
the combination of qualitative and quantitative factors highlighted by Langohr and 
Langohr that places significant importance on the subjective judgements made by 
credit rating agencies during their assessments of sovereign entities. Moody’s openly 
acknowledges the importance of such subjective judgements, pointing out that ‘by the 
very nature of sovereignty, a government may decide not to repay its debt despite 
having the resources to do so’.212 Such an observation goes to the very heart of the 
sovereign credit rating assessment process. The data alone will not tell the story. To 
adequately assess a sovereign’s credit rating, knowledge providers must gain an 
understanding of the intent motivating a sovereign’s decision makers.  
Herein lies the challenge for both the assessor and the assessed. Discovering 
the rationale motivating decision makers in any given state can be difficult for 
experienced domestic political observers, yet alone credit analysts. Each state has its 
own unique policy formation structure, with distinguishing features that render a 
formulaic approach redundant. For example, issues relating to political competition 
and its ramifications can vary greatly, depending on the nature of political party 
structures that determine how inter-party and intra-party rivalry is accommodated. 
The relationship between elected politicians and unelected officials can substantially 
differ between states and these relationships have a material impact on the decision 
making process. It is perhaps for these reasons that Fitch acknowledges that ‘political 
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and social tensions can have an important bearing on sovereign creditworthiness’.213  
This acknowledgement forms the basis for the admission by Fitch that when seeking 
to assess the creditworthiness of a sovereign entity, ‘account is also taken of powerful 
vested interests that may block essential structural reforms’.214 
Each of the major credit rating agencies provides a credit rating for a large and 
growing number of sovereigns. Standard and Poor’s rates 126 sovereign entities,215 as 
does Moody’s,216 while Fitch covers 111 issuers.217 The lists of sovereign entities 
subjected to scrutiny by credit rating agencies reveal state actors from all geographies, 
varying stages of development and a myriad of political systems. Indeed, each has its 
own unique cultural overlay that shapes the decision making process. Publicly 
available information alone is simply inadequate if the credit rating agencies are to 
provide insightful and accurate assessments on the political risks and policy choices 
associated with the creditworthiness of sovereign actors. Moody’s have acknowledged 
that numbers alone will not allow them to determine the likely course of action 
pursued by key decision makers in any given state. It is for this reason that each of the 
major credit rating agencies interacts with state actors to seek a greater understanding 
of the rationale guiding the policies pursued by state actors.  
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For IPE scholars, the fusion between the political and economic factors behind 
the assessments of the creditworthiness of state actors provides a poignant example of 
the growing relevance of IPE in the modern international system. The combination of 
these two sets of factors creates a multifarious dynamic that, until recently, has not 
been subject to the scholarly scrutiny it deserves. Historically, both have been viewed 
as silos, independent of the other. The traditional approach to analysis of finance-
related issues ignores the reality of modern decision making. Indeed, the melding of 
the political and economic spheres in contemporary global governance lacks the 
theoretical clarity typically associated with each field. Policy making by state actors 
can often be messy and surprisingly difficult to predict. Yet it is here, at the juncture 
of two key fields of scholarship, that credit rating agencies and state actors collide, 
with substantial ramifications for global governance.  
This collision is not a collision between two equals. The modern global 
financial system accentuates the reliance of participants in that system on the 
knowledge structure created by credit rating agencies to inform investment decisions. 
This reliance also relates to those financial products that are linked to state actors, 
such as the sovereign bond market. In the September 2011 Global Financial Stability 
Report, the IMF observed that ‘investors are more risk conscious, including regarding 
the risks associated with liquidity and sovereign credit’.218 This observation is 
reinforced by the IMF’s ‘Survey on Global and Asset Allocation’, which showed that 
sovereign or country risk was the fourth highest factor considered by asset managers 
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when considering cross border investment.
219
 A year earlier, at the launch of the 
September 2010 Global Financial Stability Report, the IMF’s Financial Counsellor 
and Director of the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets (MCM) Department, Jose 
Vinals, provided commentary on the contents of the Report and its ramifications for 
global finance. Vinals observed that ‘over the years, credit ratings have become hard-
wired in various rules, regulations ... rating downgrades can lead to destabilising spill 
over effects as investors rush to sell securities, in particular when downgrades go 
through investment quality thresholds. These are the so-called cliff effects’.220 
For sovereigns, the prospect of a credit rating triggering a ‘cliff effect’ 
provides a powerful incentive to cooperate with credit rating agencies when they seek 
information. The ramifications on the global financial markets of a negative 
announcement from a credit rating agency can be immediate, as seen in the previous 
chapter. The IMF’s Senior Financial Expert, John Kiff observed at the same Report 
launch that ‘ratings play a significant certification role...downgrades from investment 
to speculative grade led to statistically significant widening of credit spreads of the 
downgraded sovereign’.221 This development can dramatically increase the borrowing 
costs of state actors. With over 100 sovereigns being constantly assessed by all three 
of the major credit rating agencies, few can afford to ignore these powerful 
knowledge providers. As observed in The Economist, ‘the rules of the financial 
system make ratings impossible to ignore ...politicians fetishise ratings, too’.222 The 
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same article quoted an un-named ratings agency executive who claimed that 
‘countries can go bust in a matter of weeks if the markets close to them’.223 
This dynamic puts the credit rating agencies in a far more powerful position 
than the sovereigns they are seeking to assess. The uneven distribution of authority 
has profound consequences on the credit rating process for sovereign actors. An 
improved understanding of those components of the sovereign rating process that are 
not based on data collation, such as assessments around the risks associated with 
political decision making, will reward observers with enhanced comprehension of 
how credit rating agencies influence state actors in the modern international system. 
Given the centrality of state actors in traditional IPE analysis, improved 
comprehension of the relationship between credit rating agencies and sovereign actors 
will also enable a better understanding of contemporary global governance. 
The challenge for scholars lies in the fact that this component of credit risk 
analysis is, by its nature, more subjective and open to interpretation than analysis 
regarding, for example, fiscal or monetary policy. Indeed, as previously observed, 
Timothy Sinclair has identified sovereign rating as the most political of all the 
ratings.
224
 The opacity surrounding this process generates additional obstacles. 
Understanding where decision makers actually lie within complex organisational 
structures and who exerts influence on these individuals can be difficult. However, the 
credit rating agencies are frequently reaching determinations about how decision 
makers in states are likely to behave. These determinations are not based on data. 
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Rather, they are based on judgements. How these judgements evolve into knowledge 
that guides investment choices is highly relevant to contemporary global governance.  
As outlined in previous chapters, the growth in the volume of information 
available and the expanding scale of the global financial system empower those who 
help shape the conceptual systems that are so central to knowledge generation and 
distribution. One of the key tests in the modern international system can be observed 
when the knowledge generation capabilities of credit rating agencies are in direct 
conflict with the knowledge generation capabilities of state actors. The outcome of 
such conflicts exposes the conceptual systems that underlie the contemporary 
knowledge hierarchy and the location of structural and relational power in the modern 
international system. The nature of communication between various actors engaged 
with the global financial system frequently creates a dynamic where conflicts over 
knowledge generation are conducted through highly visible mediums such as the 
financial or political media. For observers of contemporary global governance, the 
direct and indirect interactions between competing knowledge generators can provide 
valuable context for assessments about the location and exercise of authority and 
power in the modern international system.  
To achieve such an outcome, there are benefits in identifying those sovereigns 
who have particularly strong sensitivities to the assessments of credit rating agencies. 
Such state actors are more likely to publicly engage with credit rating agencies and 
dispute their judgements, providing scholars with greater visibility over the interaction 
process and contested knowledge generation. An increasingly topical source of high 
profile interaction and disputation between sovereigns and credit rating agencies is the 
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EU. Key structural issues in the EU create a financial dynamic that is conducive to a 
contested knowledge generation process between state actors and credit rating 
agencies.  
On 13 December 2007, twenty-seven EU Member States signed the Lisbon 
Treaty, which officially came into force on 1 December 2009.
225
 The Lisbon Treaty 
ostensibly sought to contemporise the EU’s two treaties, the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Community, to reform 
Europe’s legal framework to ensure it better reflected modern governance 
challenges.
226
 This process saw the EU’s prescriptive governance frameworks 
amended across a broad range of policy areas, including finance. According to Article 
123 of the amended Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, overdraft 
facilities or any type of credit facility with the European Central Bank (ECB) or 
national central banks in favour of public authorities, including central governments, 
are prohibited.
227
 The ECB and national central banks therefore cannot purchase 
standard government bonds, in contrast to many other developed states where central 
banks are free to do so. Such arrangements render sovereign members of the EU more 
reliant than many of their contemporaries on securing investment for government 
bonds via private capital markets.  
As outlined previously, many state actors are reliant on the issuance of 
government bonds to help fund their activities. The knowledge that influences the 
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views of non-government investors will therefore have a direct impact on the costs of 
borrowing for EU states through the yields paid on government bonds. Sovereigns are 
therefore motivated to positively shape the perceptions of financial market 
participants and challenge negative commentary wherever possible. Smaller 
sovereigns within the EU have a particularly acute need to seek to create knowledge 
and actively shape the perceptions of investors, given they typically issue smaller 
volumes of government bonds, reducing familiarity amongst bond traders and making 
their bond markets susceptible to rapid shifts in market sentiment. The difference in 
volumes can be seen in Figure Fourteen, which provides indicative data on the 
variations in volumes of long term government bond and note issuances between 
select EU sovereigns. 
Figure Fourteen
228
 
Volume of Long Term Government Bond and Note Issuance, Q3 2010 ($USm) 
 
Sovereign 
 
Volume 
Germany 
 
$1,291,616 
France 
 
$1,109,359 
Ireland 
 
$103,752 
Poland 
 
$1,100 
Hungary 
 
$455 
 
A poignant example of the unbalanced nature of the knowledge generation 
dynamic, and its consequences for contemporary global governance, can be found in 
the Irish experience of 2010. A small, developed country with a robust and pluralistic 
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domestic political system, Ireland faced enormous challenges following the global 
financial crisis. Ireland’s economy limped weakly out of technical recession in the 
first quarter of 2010 after being the first euro-zone country to fall into recession in 
2008.
229
 Falling house prices and rising unemployment had forced the Irish 
Government to raise taxes to protect the sovereign’s financial position.230 The 
deteriorating state of public finances in Ireland drew the attention of all major credit 
rating agencies and international bond investors. In the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, Ireland’s position was not unique. However, the very public nature of 
the interactions between the Irish Government and the credit rating agencies provides 
a particularly revealing insight into the process that is so pivotal to contemporary 
global governance.  
As the Irish Government’s financial position deteriorated during 2010, the role 
of the Irish National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) gained global 
prominence. In his opening statement to the House of the Oireachtas (National 
Parliament) Committee of Public Accounts hearing in April 2010, NTMA Chief 
Executive John Corrigan described the Agency’s role as: 
firstly to lead discussions with the covered credit institutions to determine 
their likely capital requirements, secondly to negotiate the terms and 
conditions on which any capital support provided by the State will be invested 
and, thirdly, to manage any Ministerial shareholdings in these institutions.
231
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Mr Corrigan went on to note that NTMA offered the state, ‘market facing expertise 
and experience with dealing with capital markets on a day to day basis’ and observed 
that the Agency’s role had ‘evolved from a single function organisation to one that 
provides a range of risk management and financial services to the State’.232  
These roles saw the NTMA act as the primary conduit between the Irish 
Government and the credit rating agencies during a tumultuous period for Irish public 
finances. The Irish sovereign’s decision making environment is relatively transparent 
and therefore easier for the credit rating agencies to observe. When describing the 
NTMA’s activities to Irish Parliamentarians, CEO John Corrigan said ‘these functions 
are being carried out in close consultation with the Minister and his Department’.233 
Theoretically, this role also made the NTMA an influential source of knowledge for 
international bond investors.   
After overseeing the auction of 10.764 billion euros worth of Irish 
Government Bonds in 2009,
234
 the NTMA was compelled to raise 14.883 billion 
euros on the bond market in the first nine months of 2010 to meet the financing needs 
of the Irish Government.
235
 For the NTMA, 2009 had indeed proved difficult, with Mr 
Corrigan noting ‘the challenges which Ireland faced in the international bond markets 
coming into 2009 were exceptional in terms of the level of our funding requirement, 
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investor sentiment, competition for available funds and market volatility’.236 Like 
other sovereigns seeking to borrow via the international bond market, the cost of 
borrowing grew as the yields payable grew. The basic market forces at work were 
relatively straightforward. The safer the investment was perceived by investors, the 
lower the bond yield. If necessary, sovereigns are forced to pay investors higher 
interest payments to stimulate demand. Under cross examination by Parliamentarians 
during the House of the Oireachtas Committee of Public Accounts hearing, Mr 
Corrigan noted that for Ireland, ‘the cost of debt is generally measured on the basis of 
the spread to Germany. In other words, it is measured on how much we pay for ten-
year bonds, which is a benchmark maturity. In an auction held yesterday, we paid a 
spread of 158 basis points or 1.58% over Germany’.237  
In such an environment, with multiple sovereigns regularly seeking to borrow 
through access to the international bond market, market perceptions play a critical role 
in the borrowing costs of state actors, best illustrated in bond spreads. Those 
perceptions are shaped by knowledge. The source of that knowledge and the way it is 
created can have immediate and drastic ramifications for state actors. The Irish 
experience of 2010 provides scholars with an informative snapshot of how knowledge 
is created and who is recognised as being the authoritative source of knowledge in the 
modern international system.  
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This process can be challenging to identify. Indeed, Edward Comor’s notion of 
a ‘complex process of conceptual systems’ that refine information into what is 
‘known’, provides a poignant theoretical signpost to the contemporary sovereign 
rating process.
238
 Over the course of 2010, as numerous sovereigns sought to shape 
what was ‘known’ about their creditworthiness amongst financial market participants, 
both the Irish Government and the credit rating agencies were potentially key 
influences over the conceptual systems described by Comor.  
At this time, Ireland’s deteriorating economic position put the Irish 
sovereign’s lead financial agency, the NTMA, in a challenging position. Bond market 
volatility and risk aversion were continuing, as other European countries like Greece 
strained under their ballooning public debt burden and diminishing revenue base. 
How the NTMA sought to appease market participants and simultaneously engage 
with the credit rating agencies provides strong evidence of the subordinated role of 
state actors in the knowledge generation process embedded in the modern 
international system. How the credit rating agencies made determinations on Irish 
public finances during 2010 illustrates the central role of the subjective judgements 
they make and the role of political as well as economic factors that are considered in 
that process. 
As the primary Irish interlocutor with international bond investors, the NTMA 
was in regular dialogue with market participants. As we have seen, the organisation 
was in contact with capital markets on a daily basis. According to the NTMA’s 2010 
Annual Report: 
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the Funding and Debt Management team continues to work hard to maintain 
strong, supportive relationships with key international investors in Irish 
Government debt and to identify and develop relationships with prospective 
new investors. Those relationships will be a key element in positioning Ireland 
to return to the international bond markets as soon as market conditions 
permit.
239
  
The Irish Government sought to engage in frequent and meaningful discussions with 
international bond investors to help provide information and shape opinions regarding 
Irish public finances. In essence, the Irish Government attempted to create knowledge 
about the attractiveness of Irish sovereign bonds.  
  At the same time, the Irish Government also engaged with the credit rating 
agencies. Given each of the major three agencies actively monitor the Irish sovereign, 
the existence of such dialogue is unsurprising. In April 2010, NTMA Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) John Corrigan informed Irish Parliamentarians that the NTMA had ‘a 
very open relationship with the credit rating agencies’ and that ‘we are talking 
regularly that is, at least once a month, to the rating agencies which are continually 
reviewing Ireland’s fiscal and banking position’.240 Deputy Brian Lenihan, then 
Minister for Finance, informed a Parliamentary colleague that ‘all the rating agencies 
are in regular contact with my officials, along with officials of the NTMA, the Central 
Bank and many other public and private bodies in Ireland. While the rating 
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methodology is public, the agencies do not set targets or criteria for individual 
countries’.241  
In a separate Parliamentary interaction, Deputy Lenihan revealed that ‘as part 
of my function as Minister for Finance, I meet with a wide variety of organisations, 
including on occasion, credit rating agencies. In the past six months I have only met 
with representatives of Standard and Poor’s on 18 February 2009 to discuss the 
budgetary and economic outlook for Ireland’.242 The rationale behind this dialogue is 
also relatively easy to identify. When credit rating agencies disclose their assessments 
to market participants, they play a critical role in shaping market perceptions. By 
engaging with the credit rating agencies directly and via entities such as the NTMA, 
the Irish Government was clearly attempting to influence both the credit rating 
process and market perceptions.  
In his April 2010 evidence to the House of the Oireachtas Committee of Public 
Accounts hearing, Mr Corrigan provided no indication of any acrimony or 
fundamental disagreements between the NTMA and the credit rating agencies. He 
indicated that dialogue was relatively frequent, that the relationship was ‘very open’ 
and saw no clouds on Ireland’s immediate ratings horizon. At this time, Mr Corrigan 
went so far as to tell Irish Parliamentarians that ‘sentiment towards Ireland, as 
reflected in the bond spreads, has improved and we believe there is a reasonable 
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prospect of the negative outlook moving to a stable outlook’.243 Tellingly, at this 
juncture, the Irish Government was in regular dialogue with the credit rating agencies 
and had a relatively bullish expectation on the outlook provided by these agencies 
being improved. On the same day that the NTMA was presenting evidence to the Irish 
Parliament, Moody’s released a statement that announced there would be no rating 
impact from that day’s announcement by Eurostat that Ireland’s budget deficit was 
worse than expected.
244
  
The following eight months betrayed the optimistic outlook of the NTMA’s 
views in April 2010. Between April and December 2010, every major credit rating 
agency downgraded the Irish Government’s rating, as seen in Figure Fifteen. Such 
frequent and substantial actions by the credit rating agencies appear incongruous with 
the relatively upbeat assessment provided by the NTMA in April 2010. 
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Figure Fifteen
245
 
Irish Sovereign Credit Rating Downgrades 
April 2010 – December 2010 
  
Date Rating Agency Action 
29 July 2010 Moody’s Downgrade Irish Government 
bond ratings from Aa1 to Aa2. 
24 August 2010 Standard and Poor’s Downgrade long term Irish 
Government bonds one notch to 
from AA to AA-.  
5 October 2010 Moody’s Place Irish Government bond 
ratings on review for possible 
downgrade.  
 
6 October 2010 Fitch Ratings Downgrade Irish Government 
bond ratings from A+ to AA-.  
23 November 2010 Standard and Poor’s Downgrade long term Irish 
Government bonds from AA- to 
A and short term Irish 
Government bonds from A-1 to 
A-1+.  
9 December 2010 Fitch Ratings Downgrade long term Irish 
Government three notches from 
A+ to BBB+.  
17 December 2010 Moody’s Downgrade Irish Government 
bonds by five notches from Aa2 
to Baa1.  
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The rationale of the credit rating agencies for the above decisions were centred 
on the deteriorating position of the Irish Government’s finances, the weakening 
growth outlook for the Irish economy and assessments around the contingent 
liabilities from the Irish banking system. For example, when explaining the rationale 
for the 19 July downgrade, Moody’s Vice President and Senior Credit Officer for 
Ireland, Dietmar Hornung said, ‘today’s downgrade is primarily driven by the Irish 
Government’s gradual but significant loss of financial strength, as reflected by its 
deteriorating debt affordability’.246 When narrating Fitch Ratings’ October 
downgrade, Fitch’s Director of Sovereign Ratings Chris Pryce said, the move ‘reflects 
the … greater-than-expected fiscal costs associated with the government’s 
recapitalisation of the Irish banks, especially Anglo Irish Bank’.247 
It is clear that in April 2010, fully cognisant of the Irish Government’s 
financial position, the growth outlook and the contingent liabilities from the Irish 
banking system, that the NTMA was not expecting the unanimous and precipitous 
deterioration in its credit rating that was seen over the remainder of 2010. Based on 
the above quote from a Fitch Ratings representative, the deterioration in public 
finances was greater than the ratings agencies had expected. What was once a 
relatively benign rating environment became incredibly challenging for the Irish 
Government in a very short period of time. Indeed, The Irish Times noted that ‘the 
auction of a rich country’s bonds was, until the very recent past, barely newsworthy. 
Raising money from investors was to governments what withdrawing a small sum 
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from an ATM is to most people. Now it’s different. Each time a fiscally weak euro 
zone country seeks to tap the market, there is a collective holding of breath for fear 
that investors will turn their noses up at the bonds’.248  
Critically, there is evidence that the working relationship between the NTMA 
and the credit rating agencies fractured during this period. Given the identifiable 
differences of opinion on Ireland’s fiscal outlook, this is not surprising. Perhaps the 
best example was the Irish Government’s reaction to Standard and Poor’s August 
ratings downgrade. When announcing the downgrade, Trevor Cullinan, credit analyst 
at Standard and Poor’s said, ‘the downgrade reflects our opinion that the rising 
budgetary costs of supporting the Irish financial sector will further weaken the 
government’s fiscal flexibility over the medium term’.249 Mr Cullinan went on to offer 
the familiar carrot and stick analysis regarding Ireland’s outlook: ‘The negative 
outlook reflects our view that the rating could be lowered again if ...the government’s 
fiscal performance improves more slowly than we currently assume. Conversely, the 
outlook could be revised to stable if the Irish government looks more likely to achieve 
its fiscal target  ...or if the banking sector stabilises more quickly and at a lower fiscal 
cost to the government than we know think likely’.250 
The market reaction to the announcement was swift, with Irish borrowing 
costs jumping immediately following the Standard and Poor’s announcement. The 
yield on ten-year bonds rose twenty-two basis points on the same day.
251
 Participants 
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in the financial markets expressed little surprise at the announcement. Greg Peters, 
Global Head of Fixed Income and Economic Research at Morgan Stanley said the 
downgrade was ‘not a surprise by any stretch’.252 Sarah Johnson, Senior Research 
Director (Global Economics) at IHS Global Insight said the Standard and Poor’s 
announcement ‘simply brought the rating agency’s analysis into line with her own’.253 
Lee Markowitz, Partner at Continental Capital Advisors, a New York-based hedge 
fund, was quoted as saying in relation to the downgrade, ‘I don’t see any light on the 
horizon’.254 The unanimity with which the credit rating agencies and participants in 
the global financial markets reached a relatively bearish position on the Irish 
sovereign’s position lay in stark contrast to the position of the Irish Government and 
its reaction to the Standard and Poor’s downgrade.  
In a statement on the downgrade, the NTMA said, ‘in terms of the specific 
analysis by S&P, this is largely predicated upon an extreme estimate of bank 
recapitalisation costs of up to fifty billion euros. We believe this approach is 
flawed’.255 NTMA Chief Executive John Corrigan was more colourful in his analysis 
of the Standard and Poor’s decision, when he told The Independent newspaper that 
‘it’s a bit like waking up the patient in the middle of an operation to tell him he’s not 
feeling well. We know the situation is pretty painful but we have to get to the end of 
the operation, which will be in December’.256 Four months after telling Irish 
Parliamentarians that the Irish Government had a close working relationship with the 
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credit rating agencies and that he envisaged no significant clouds on the ratings 
horizon, Mr Corrigan was openly lashing out at both the analysis driving ratings 
decisions and the timing of those rating decisions. Others associated with the Irish 
Government’s budgetary position were also critical of the market reaction, with the 
Governor of the Irish Central Bank, Patrick Honohan, describing the widening of 
spreads to 320 basis points above German bunds in response to the Standard and 
Poor’s announcement as ‘ridiculous’.257  
Tellingly, the Irish Government received sympathy from other state actors. In 
the immediate aftermath of the Standard and Poor’s August 2010 announcement, the 
Canadian Finance Minister told The Irish Times, ‘quite frankly, some of the work 
done by ratings agencies did not assist and contributed to what became a serious 
global crisis, so they are part of the story. It is not as if they can stand on high and 
look down and start now being critical of others who are tying to sort their way out of 
a crisis that they contributed to’.258 Such comments reflected unease amongst 
sovereign policy makers about the role of the credit rating agencies in sovereign credit 
rating and their influence over international bond markets.  
Over the course of the second half of 2010, the actions of credit rating 
agencies relating to Irish Government bonds became more instructive. For example, 
on 5 October 2010, Moody’s placed Ireland’s Aa2 local and foreign currency 
government bonds on review for possible downgrade.
259
 Dietmar Hornung, a 
Moody’s Vice President-Senior Credit Officer and lead sovereign analyst for Ireland 
                                                 
257
 John Walsh, ‘Bond markets: Bond market vigilantes’, Business and Finance (September 2010), 
accessed 19/09/10, http://www.businessandfinance.ie/index.jsp?p=847&n=819&a=3911 
258
 Simon Carswell, ‘Canada says Irish finance policies brave’, The Irish Times (27 August 2010), p. 2.  
259
 Moody’s, ‘Announcement: Moody’s places Ireland’s Aa2 rating on review for possible downgrade’, 
(5 October 2010), p. 1.  
 124 
announced that ‘a key element of the review is Ireland’s revised four-year fiscal plan, 
which the Government will present in early November. The plan will identify 
measures to stabilise public finances and bring the deficit below 3% of GDP by 
2013’.260 Such overt and highly prescriptive observations by the credit rating agencies 
were designed to influence the Irish Government’s decision making processes. The 
announcement of a review also revealed an acknowledgement that Moody’s was 
uncertain of how Irish decision makers would respond to the need for budget cuts. By 
expressing confidence in the likely outcome of Ireland’s fiscal review while 
simultaneously placing Irish Government bonds on review for possible downgrade, 
Moody’s was amplifying pressure on the Irish Government to adhere to recommended 
policy initiatives and whetting the appetite of investors for the outcome of their 
deliberations. Given the timing of the Irish electoral cycle, with a general election due 
early in 2011, any rating product that addressed perceived uncertainty around Irish 
decision making would likely be well received by bond market investors.   
The response to such edicts from the Irish Government reveals the relational 
power enjoyed by the credit rating agencies, particularly relating to smaller EU 
sovereign borrowers. Despite the obvious possibility of an electoral backlash, decision 
makers, inured to the impact of repeated and unexpected credit rating downgrades, 
duly responded to the demands of the credit rating agencies. In November 2010, the 
Irish Government released The National Recovery Plan: 2011-2014, which broadly 
adhered to the parameters articulated by Moody’s the previous month.261 In the 
introduction of the document, the Irish Government explicitly acknowledged that 
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lower growth and higher debt interest costs ‘have required us to revise our budgetary 
targets. To achieve a deficit of 3% of GDP by 2014, the Government has concluded 
that an overall saving of 15 billion euro is required’.262 While the deficit reduction 
target was one year later than the date mooted in Moody’s October 2010 review, the 
scale of the budgetary measures contained in the Recovery Plan were significant. 
Welfare expenditure was cut by 2.8 billion euro, over 24,000 public service jobs cut, 
pensions reduced, minimum wages cut by one euro to 7.65 euro and several taxes 
were increased.
263
 
Such actions by a sovereign government only months before a general election 
reflect the overwhelming imperative on state actors to appease the credit rating 
agencies and the global financial markets. They also attest to the relational, as well as 
structural power exercised by the credit rating agencies, as defined by Susan 
Strange.
264
 In a contested knowledge generation process, the Irish Government in the 
second half of 2010 was caught in a vicious spiral. As credit rating agencies became 
more bearish on the creditworthiness of the Irish sovereign, the markets reacted by 
widening the yield spread between Irish ten-year bonds and German ten- year bonds, 
increasing the Irish Government’s borrowing costs. Despite the best efforts of the 
Irish Government to communicate a more bullish outlook through direct and indirect 
dialogue with market participants, key Irish decision makers ultimately acquiesced to 
the market consensus, implementing an extraordinarily tough National Recovery Plan.  
This process also corroded confidence in the Irish economy. In early October 
2010, the Chief Economist at KBC Ireland told Bloomberg that ‘Ireland has 
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experienced a great panic’ and that there is a ‘risk that a sense of apocalyptic gloom 
may trigger a freeze in spending’.265 Such views were supported by the statistics. 
According to the OECD, the Irish economy shrank by 1.4% in the fourth quarter of 
2010, after growing by 1.5% in the first quarter of the same year.
266
 Irish producers 
and consumers were not immune from the torrent of negative coverage generated by 
the successive downgrades of the Irish sovereign by the credit rating agencies. Indeed, 
the impact of the knowledge generation process on the real economy only 
compounded the challenges faced by the Irish Government and in effect increased 
sensitivity to the ongoing deliberations of the credit rating agencies.  
The reaction by both the global financial markets and the broader Irish 
economy to the credit rating downgrades in the second half of 2010 reinforces the 
relevance of Rosenau’s theory of intersubjective consensus.267 Different actors with 
different interests acted in similar ways, due to their submission to a process of 
learning. Despite the best efforts of the Irish Government to communicate confidence, 
the consensus amongst a wide range of disparate stakeholders clearly demonstrated 
where authority in the modern international system lies. The Irish Government simply 
was not viewed as a reliable source of knowledge on its own creditworthiness. Even 
when Irish decision makers openly and aggressively challenged the rationale for 
certain rating downgrades, the market response synchronised with the assessments of 
the credit rating agencies. This obdurate response rendered the Irish sovereign unable 
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to do anything but comply with the explicit pathway set out by the credit rating 
agencies, and pursue difficult and electorally damaging reforms.  
During this time, the enforcement mechanisms associated with knowledge 
provision and the enforcement of norms, as described by Mark Amen,
268
 were on 
graphic display. Yield spreads on Irish Government bonds widened in tandem with 
credit rating agency announcements as investors predictably responded to increasingly 
cautious assessments. Increased borrowing costs and deteriorating economic 
confidence punished the Irish sovereign, providing a powerful incentive for Irish 
decision makers to adhere to prescriptive measures suggested by the credit rating 
agencies in the commentary that surrounding their assessments. The political price for 
the severity of the National Recovery Plan was high. The governing Fianna Fail Party 
called a general election for 25 February 2011. At that election Fianna Fail suffered an 
enormous 24.2% drop in its support, losing fifty-eight seats in the Irish Dail to be left 
with only twenty seats out of 166.
269
  
The results of the 2011 Irish General Election reflected another enforcement 
mechanism associated with knowledge generation. The consensus amongst Irish 
voters at the end of a tumultuous period for the Irish economy was clear. The 
incumbent decision makers, those who had so robustly defended the Irish outlook 
over the course of 2010, were severely punished at the ballot box. This enforcement 
mechanism was distinctly political, providing another layer of motivation to elected 
sovereign decision makers. Contemporaries in other jurisdictions would have 
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observed with interest the financial, economic and political fallout for state actors who 
openly reject the validity of the knowledge generated by credit rating agencies.  
The Irish experience of 2010 crystallises the power of knowledge in the 
modern international system and who has the authority in that system to generate 
knowledge. The Irish Government, directly and through the NTMA, regularly 
engaged with the credit rating agencies to help shape their assessments. The same 
government sought to influence market participants through direct dialogue and 
public statements. It proved to be a one sided conversation.  When differences 
emerged, as seen in the middle of that year, the consensus by various actors in the 
modern international system quickly coalesced around the position of the credit rating 
agencies, leaving a relatively defenceless state actor impotent. The Irish experience is 
particularly noteworthy given the transparent decision making processes at play. For 
sovereign risk analysts at credit rating agencies, there was little of the opacity 
experienced in many other states. Yet, when opinions diverged, there was only one 
clear winner.  
The interactions between state actors and credit rating agencies are formal and 
informal, frequent and intermittent, collaborative and hostile. Yet these interactions, 
which have such resonance for contemporary global governance, are distinctly one 
sided. State actors are clearly not seen as objective and reliable sources of knowledge 
regarding their own financial health. The authority in the modern international system 
unambiguously lies with credit rating agencies, who enjoy the support of an 
intersubjective consensus between a broad range of actors, particularly within the 
global financial markets. The enforcement mechanisms that reinforce contemporary 
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norms are both powerful and immediate. Credit rating agencies are able to employ 
both structural and relational power to heavily influence sovereign actors. Within this 
context, the hierarchy of knowledge is all too clear. States play a subordinated role in 
knowledge generation. This role can be further compromised when political factors 
come to the fore and the credit rating agencies use political as well as economic 
considerations to determine a sovereign’s creditworthiness.  
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Chapter Five: A Tightened Straightjacket 
The subordinated role of state actors in the critical process of knowledge 
generation has a broad range of important ramifications on their decision making 
processes. Repeated attempts by sovereign decision makers to appease the credit 
rating agencies illustrate the broad acceptance by this once authoritative group of 
actors of the hierarchy of knowledge that exists in the modern international system. 
The Irish experience from 2010 clearly demonstrates a dynamic that is distinctly one 
sided. The Irish example saw a government about to face an election willingly 
implement potentially unpopular reforms to pacify the credit rating agencies. That 
government subsequently lost its bid for re-election, with elected officials paying a 
significant price for their accommodation of the edicts of credit rating agencies. As 
seen in the previous chapter, sovereign decision makers may complain in public and 
robust terms, but they frequently acquiesce to the needs and desires of credit rating 
agencies. While this appeasement is well recognised, the process behind it is not 
adequately understood.  
As outlined previously, the credit rating agencies deliberately apply political 
as well as economic considerations when assessing a sovereign’s creditworthiness. At 
times, political considerations can become paramount to the conclusions they reach. 
For IPE scholars, analysis of the interaction between sovereign actors and credit rating 
agencies must extend well beyond cause and effect in order to obtain a more 
comprehensive understanding of this influential process.  
Actors with authority are typically adroit at exerting influence over 
subordinated actors. Credit rating agencies are now adept at cajoling sovereigns, 
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particularly those with an acute sensitivity to their determinations, to pursue certain 
courses of action that they deem are in the best interests of enhanced creditworthiness. 
How credit rating agencies use their position at the top of the knowledge generation 
hierarchy shapes contemporary global governance. This influence extends well 
beyond straightforward recommendations on economic policy that would in their 
view improve the creditworthiness of sovereigns. In the twenty-first century, credit 
rating agencies are leveraging their knowledge generation capabilities to carefully and 
effectively influence domestic decision making in a number of sovereigns. This 
influence extends up and down Rosenau’s continuum of global governance,270 
shaping both formal policies and informal norms.  
For scholars seeking an enhanced understanding of this process, the beginning 
and end of electoral cycles within rated sovereigns can be revealing. At the end of 
electoral cycles, sovereign decision makers, aware they are about to face their voters, 
often have a heightened sensitivity to the sorts of negative media coverage that 
typically surrounds sovereign rating downgrades or negative commentary from the 
credit rating agencies. At the same time, they must be seen as decisive and serving the 
national interest. Election promises are made by political parties in and out of power, 
some of which are costly. At the beginning of electoral cycles, governments with new 
mandates are often eager to clearly demonstrate early signs of the implementation of 
their policy agenda and stamp their authority over decision making processes. This 
period also enables those sovereign decision makers elected to government from 
opposition to receive updated information from public sector agencies and 
departments that can impact the assessments they make.  
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After carefully observing state actors over decades, including those from 
pluralistic democracies, the credit rating agencies are aware that political risks can 
become amplified in certain stages of the electoral cycle. Using Standard and Poor’s 
own explanation of its sovereign ratings methodology, ‘the effectiveness, stability, 
and predictability of the sovereign’s policymaking and political institutions’ are a 
primary factor driving the political score received by state actors.
271
 These political 
scores influence the ratings generated by the credit rating agencies. The Irish example 
demonstrates that as part of their sovereign rating process, credit rating agencies 
directly engage with both elected and unelected government officials to obtain 
information on a country’s policy settings. These officials understand the motivation 
behind the engagement and are cognisant of the ramifications of any adverse 
conclusions reach by the credit rating agencies. These interactions, which take many 
forms, lie at the very heart of contemporary global governance.  
Another sovereign that provides a poignant example of the contemporary 
interplay between state actors and credit rating agencies can be found in Hungary 
during 2010. As a member of the EU, the successful sale of Hungarian Government 
bonds is reliant on interest by investors in the private capital markets. Hungary is an 
emerging market from Eastern Europe and particularly susceptible to rapid changes in 
market sentiment. As outlined in the previous chapter, Hungarian bond sales are 
typically much smaller in scale than other EU states, reducing the familiarity amongst 
prospective private bond investors with the Hungarian bond market.  
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Hungary’s experience during 2010 was to a very large extent contextualised 
by the events of 2008, when the sovereign’s securities market came under significant 
stress and the Hungarian Government was forced to turn to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for a US$15.7 billion loan.
272
 For a country with a strong nationalist 
element, such overt international involvement in Hungarian affairs was a bitter pill to 
swallow. The stand-by arrangement with the Hungarian sovereign was designed by 
the IMF to ‘facilitate the rapid reduction of financial market stress in Hungary, while 
supporting the country’s longer-run economic goals by creating conditions necessary 
to facilitate appropriate reforms in government finances’.273 The IMF’s loan came 
with highly prescriptive and very public set of policy recommendations. When 
announcing the loan, the IMF declared that ‘given the structure of the Hungarian 
budget, among other areas, adjustment will need to include revisions of wages and 
pensions ...expenditure restraint will be achieved in part through reductions in the 
overall government wage and pension bill’.274 
For the then Socialist Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsany, the conditions 
attached to the loan by the IMF presented significant political challenges, with harsh 
spending cuts impacting public sector workers and pensioners. The New York Times 
noted that the agreement Hungary had signed with IMF had put the country ‘in an 
awful vice’ and having ‘mandated to squeeze its budget deficit below 3 percent of 
gross domestic product, the government is in no position to stimulate the economy 
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...there is no painless path to recovery’.275 The pain inflicted by the IMF’s conditions 
was exacerbated by earlier comments by Prime Minister Gyurcsany that a security 
reserve ‘hopefully never has to be used’.276 However traumatic the process, Prime 
Minister Gyurcsany’s Government had made significant progress in reducing 
Hungary’s crippling debt. The Financial Times noted that ‘faced with a near-
unmanageable level of public debt’, Hungary had succeeded in narrowing it budget 
deficit from 9.2% in 2006 to a projected 3.9% by 2009.
277
 The newspaper went on to 
observe that ‘the achievement is all the more remarkable because structural reform of 
pensions and social welfare programmes was until recently thought nigh-on 
impossible in Hungary’, thanks to a generous social welfare system.278  
The political fallout from the IMF bailout and the resultant budgetary straight 
jacket echoed through the 2010 Hungarian electoral cycle. Leading up to the 
elections, the main opposition party, the centre-right Fidesz Party, heavily criticised 
the governing Socialist administration’s approach to economy policy. In February 
2010, Fidesz Party Chairman and candidate for Prime Minister Viktor Orban told 
German business leaders that ‘the era of a hectic, unpredictable and irresponsible 
government and decisions is over, the time of partnership is coming’.279 In the same 
month, Fidesz Party Vice Chairman Mihaly Varga accused the Socialist Government 
of misleading a number of important interlocutors including the Commissioner for 
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Economic and Monetary Affairs of the EU, the President of Hungary and international 
institutions.
280
 Mr Varga also indicated that greater economic integration would be a 
key priority for Fidesz if it won the election, saying ‘I do hope that by 2015 the Euro 
will be the currency in Hungary’.281 
In the build up to the April 2010 elections, Fidesz simultaneously sought to 
stoke public concerns about Hungary’s loss of face as a result of the IMF bailout. Mr 
Orban told a meeting of the European People’s Party parliamentary group leaders in 
Budapest that ‘Fidesz is ready to restore Hungary’s respect and prestige abroad, which 
has been lost in recent years’.282 As a centre-right Party, Fidesz’s platform 
unsurprisingly focused on tax cuts, job creation and supporting small businesses.
283
 
However, Fidesz resisted frequent demands for greater detail on its policy platform 
ahead of the elections, claiming the Party would be unable to accurately cost policies 
until it had assumed office, due to its lack of faith in the numbers being provided by 
the incumbent Socialist Government.
284
 
Two rounds of elections in April 2010 delivered an emphatic victory for 
Fidesz, which comprehensively swept the Socialists from power for the first time in 
eight years.
285
 The scale of their victory provided Fidesz with a two thirds majority in 
the Hungarian Parliament, enough to secure changes to the Hungarian constitution.
286
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Given Hungary’s significant and high profile financial challenges in the years 
immediately preceding the April 2010 elections, the results were closely observed by 
both international institutions such as the IMF and the global financial markets. After 
the first round of voting, media reports on the election addressed speculation on the 
financial market reaction to Fidesz’s strong showing. When the results became clear, 
Gergely Suppan, an analyst from Hungarian central bank Takarekbank, told 
international news agency Reuters that he expected ‘moderate strengthening of the 
Forint and a drop in government bond yields tomorrow’ based on the Fidesz win.287 
Given that the conditions attached to the IMF loan in 2008 required ongoing 
fiscal commitments by the Hungarian Government, Fidesz’s electoral success cast 
doubt over the consistency of the sovereign’s budgetary position. The logical 
extension of a comprehensive change in both the composition of key policy makers 
and the political ideology of those policy makers is changes to budgetary priorities. 
Given the importance credit rating agencies place on consistent and predictable 
decision making, a dramatic change in the approach of elected officials could impact 
Hungary’s political scores and ultimately its credit ratings.288 External expectations of 
significant changes to Hungary’s policy positions had grown as Fidesz’s campaign 
progressed. Viktor Orban’s statement that the elections would allow the Hungarian 
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people to ‘carry out our own revolution’, clearly communicated to domestic voters 
and offshore investors the potential for significant change.
289
   
Indeed, the change of government in Hungary introduced a new, volatile and 
less predictable decision making environment that triggered negative reactions from 
both the global financial markets and the credit rating agencies. Within weeks of their 
election to office, the Fidesz Party realised that many of their policy commitments 
may not be deliverable if Hungary was to meet the stringent policy goals set out by 
the IMF as part of its loan agreement. In a clumsy attempt to manage expectations and 
blame the previous government for not fully disclosing the real state of Hungary’s 
public finances, Fidesz Vice Chairman, Lajos Kosa said in early June 2010 that 
Hungary had a slim chance of avoiding ‘the Greek situation’.290 The next day, Peter 
Szijjarto, Prime Minister Orban's spokesman, observed that Hungary’s economy was 
in a ‘grave situation’ and added that it was ‘not an exaggeration at all’ to discuss a 
Hungarian default.
291
 Given the sensitivities associated with links to Greece’s 
sovereign debt crisis, the response from the global financial markets to these 
comments was swift. The euro sank to a four year low on news of the comments, the 
forint plunged 6% against the euro, while the cost to insure sovereign debt against 
default surged across the euro zone.
292
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Condemnation of these infelicities was widespread, particularly in the global 
financial press. Timothy Ash, Head of Emerging Market Research at the Royal Bank 
of Scotland told The Wall Street Journal that ‘you simply cannot talk like this in these 
markets’.293 Deficient apprehension of the rationale behind the comments further 
confused market observers. Otis Casey from Markit wrote in The Financial Times that 
‘market observers are struggling with trying to determine the extent to which the 
announcement may be a result of political manoeuvring to back away from campaign 
pledges to reduce taxes all the way to concerns that there may be a similar credibility 
gap to Greece regarding past budget numbers’.294 Clearly, understanding the motives 
behind public statements by elected decision makers is a priority for participants in 
the international bond markets.  
In the absence of clarity, speculation abounded. Josh Noble observed in The 
Financial Times that ‘when Hungary’s new government was elected with a clear 
mandate – markets cheered. Now, just a few days on from prime minister Viktor 
Orban taking office, the party’s over and investors are looking for the exit’.295 Preston 
Keat from the Eurasia Group observed in The Financial Times that ‘Fidesz does not 
have a coherent strategy for fiscal consolidation, and markets are now punishing them 
as a result. In the coming weeks they will need to piece together a credible outline of a 
plan, or the pain will worsen’.296 The condemnation of the new administration’s 
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comments amongst global financial market participants and observers were 
remarkably consistent in both its sentiment and its stridency.  
Amidst the significant gyrations caused on the global financial markets by the 
comments, Fidesz sought to backtrack in an effort to calm market participants. Mihaly 
Varga, a senior Cabinet official, publicly committed Fidesz to delivering a budget 
deficit ‘as small as possible’, while describing the previous comments about a 
possible default as ‘unfortunate’, adding that ‘Hungary is not among the countries that 
face a default’.297 For a newly elected sovereign government, such conflicting 
commentary from senior elected and unelected officials at a time of heightened 
market sensitivity caused significant reputational damage. The new administration 
was about to embark on negotiations with the IMF and EU over an extension of the 
2008 rescue package.
298
 Tellingly, both institutions overtly contradicted the 
Hungarian scare mongering on a possible default. Former IMF Director Dominique 
Strauss-Khan observed ‘there seems to be no particular element of concern’, while 
Eurogroup Chairman Jean-Claude Juncker told the BBC that ‘I do not see any 
problem at all with Hungary. I only see the problem that politicians from Hungary talk 
too much’.299  
Observations in the global financial media were highly critical and sought to 
define Hungary’s new government as inept. The Economist observed that Fidesz had 
‘blundered badly …by casually comparing the country’s economic woes to 
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Greece’s’.300  The newspaper went on to focus its criticism around Prime Minister 
Orban:
  
Despite winning a stonking mandate in April, the government lacks sureness 
of touch. Mr Orban has picked unnecessary fights, publicly demanding the 
sacking of the well-regarded and hawkish central-bank chief, Andras Simor. 
He has stoked a long-running ethnic dispute with neighbouring Slovakia. That 
looks reckless. Yet on serious issues, such as reforms of the bloated public 
sector and pension system, he is strangely timid.
301
 
For a heavily scrutinised sovereign government, it was not an auspicious start.   
The reaction of the global financial markets and the commentary by analysts 
and international institutions demonstrated that initial concerns about a potential 
default were soon followed by scepticism regarding the alarmist comments from the 
new Fidesz Government. The observations of key sovereign decision makers were 
ultimately dismissed by observers and the global financial markets as political 
posturing. Those observations simply did not fit within the conceptual system 
apparent in the global financial system. A pervasive market consensus prioritised the 
views of the IMF, EU and credit rating agencies over the views of elected sovereign 
decision makers.  
A newly elected government from an emerging market within the EU had 
attempted to create new knowledge regarding its budgetary position, only to quickly 
backflip in the face of a negative reaction. Comments that were primarily designed for 
a domestic political audience triggered highly negative international reactions within 
the global financial markets. The powerful enforcement mechanism embedded within 
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that system ensured a hasty clarification on the part of the new government. Indeed, 
the reaction by the markets and the subsequent backflip by Hungarian decision 
makers reinforced the conceptual system at play by providing a proof point to the 
subordinated role of elected sovereign officials in the knowledge generation process. 
The hasty change of heart by the Hungarian Government was indicative of the power 
the financial markets and their echo chamber in the financial press have over a 
number of state actors in the modern international system.  
The reputational damage amongst global market participants was particularly 
impactful for Hungary, given the emerging country’s strong reliance on the 
investment from the private capital markets in government bonds. This reliance is 
further accentuated by the fact that bank lending within the sovereign is primarily 
denominated in foreign currency, increasing the susceptibility of the Hungarian 
private sector to exchange rate fluctuations.
302
 The interplay between the Hungarian 
Government and the global financial markets during 2010 would continue to illustrate 
the subservient role a number of state actors play in the modern international system 
and the influence exerted by the credit rating agencies. These events would also place 
the distinctly political considerations used by credit rating agencies to determine a 
sovereign’s creditworthiness into perspective.    
In an attempt to rebuild the government’s economic credibility, Prime Minister 
Orban addressed the Hungarian National Assembly on 8 June to announce a package 
of economic measures designed to stabilize Hungary’s economy and restore investor 
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confidence.
303
 The package, described by the Prime Minister as an ‘Action Plan’, 
included a number of tax reform measures designed to reduce and simplify the tax 
burden for most Hungarian taxpayers through the introduction of a 16% flat tax, while 
committing to the introduction of a bank tax.
304
 The speech contained messages that 
were clearly designed to reassure the global financial markets. The Prime Minister 
told the National Assembly that ‘we would like to make it clear that the Government 
is convinced no modern economy can be competitive without a well functioning 
system of credit institutions’.305 Such public deference to the importance of the credit 
markets provided another demonstration of the pervasive pragmatism at play in 
contemporary global governance and the relational power domiciled in the 
enforcement mechanisms of the global financial system.  
The speech included initiatives that sought to demonstrate the Fidesz 
Government’s commitment to austerity measures, including, for example, a freeze on 
telephone, furniture and vehicle purchasing within the public sector.
306
 However, the 
speech also contained seemingly contradictory statements about the reliability of the 
budget data, something that had spooked the markets just days earlier. The Prime 
Minister said, ‘everyone knows the size of the problems before us. There is no room 
for guessing. Everyone could see the May budget data …unfortunately I must say that 
the figures in the budget are still rather ambiguous. We had suspected this for a long 
time’.307 
                                                 
303
 Fidesz Party, ‘Package of Economic Measures Announced by Dr. Victor Orbán’, (9 June 2010), 
accessed 19/03/11, http://www.fidesz.hu/index.php?Cikk=151660&menu=nyomtathato 
304
 Idem. 
305
 Idem. 
306
 Idem. 
307
 Idem. 
 143 
The statement to the Hungarian National Assembly was the first major policy 
address by Prime Minister Orban. It sought to commit the new Government to 
implementing the tax pledges made in the lead up to the April elections while 
addressing the perception that Fidesz lacked a comprehensive economic plan. In a 
sense the speech, which contained no fewer than twenty-nine specific commitments, 
had two distinct audiences. The first audience was domestic – those voters who had 
switched from the Socialists to Fidesz, particularly those who were attracted by the 
Fidesz election promise to reduce and simplify taxation. The second audience was 
international – those in the global financial markets, the credit rating agencies and at 
international institutions like the IMF and EU who were seeking reassurance that the 
new Government would continue with austerity measures designed to bring 
Hungary’s large public debt burden back to within what were deemed to be acceptable 
levels.  
The response from the first audience was broadly positive, as was 
demonstrated by the results of the local government elections later that year.
308
 The 
response from the second audience was fundamentally different and quickly 
forthcoming. The Economist observed that ‘Hungary is the most debt-ridden country 
in eastern Europe … cuts in public spending will have to go far beyond the gimmicky 
blitz on top salaries, official cars and mobile phones mentioned so far’.309 As an 
emerging economy in direct receipt of IMF and EU financial assistance, the new 
sovereign Government’s attempts to reassure the global financial markets were off to 
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a rocky start. While global financial market participants and observers had provided 
commentary on components of the Fidesz Government’s economic and budgetary 
policies, there was a limited amount of holistic analysis made public in the first weeks 
of the new administration. The absence of such analysis increased uncertainty 
amongst market participants, who were seeking greater clarity on the evolving 
investment environment in Hungary amidst confusing signals from domestic 
politicians.  
Credit rating agencies had closely observed the new Government’s early days 
and their assessments helped define the Orban administration for investors. On 9 June 
2010, just days after the conflicting comments had emanated out of the Hungarian 
Government, Fitch Ratings issued a statement setting out the pathway to greater 
financial stability for the sovereign. David Heslam, Head of Fitch’s Sovereign Team 
said that the announced commitment to budget deficit targets were ‘moderately 
encouraging’, while observing there was ‘little room for policy slippage’. Mr Heslam 
went on to provide very specific commentary on the default bungle, describing the 
comments from the Fidesz Government as ‘a dangerous misjudgement which has 
dented its credibility …therefore the government needs to improve its communication 
strategy and avoid other own-goals that undermine confidence’.310 Two days later, 
following an undersold Hungarian Government debt auction, Fitch observed the result 
highlighted ‘Hungary’s ongoing vulnerability to global investor risk aversion, 
sharpened recently by misjudged comments by the new Hungarian Government and 
post-election uncertainty over the outlook for public finances in the context of an 
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already high gross government debt burden’.311 Here, a key credit rating agency used 
a predictable financial market response to reinforce its own earlier observations and 
signpost the pathway to a restored position for the Hungarian sovereign.  
Shortly after the release of the Fitch statement, the IMF sent a mission to 
Budapest working in parallel with a mission from the European Union (EU).
312
 The 
purpose of the mission was to hold discussions with Hungarian authorities regarding 
the sixth and seventh reviews of the country’s loan arrangement with the IMF.313 At 
the conclusion of their visit, IMF mission leader, Stuart Rosenberg, released a 
statement outlining unambiguous feedback to Hungarian policy makers:  
In an environment of heightened market scrutiny of government deficits and 
debt levels, the fiscal deficit targets previously announced—3.8 percent of 
GDP in 2010 and below 3 percent of GDP in 2011—remain an appropriate 
anchor for the necessary consolidation process and debt sustainability, and 
should be adhered to, but additional measures will need to be taken to achieve 
these objectives.  Sustainable consolidation will require durable, non-
distortive measures, which the authorities need more time to develop. Difficult 
decisions will be needed....
314
  
The clear message for the Orban Government was that extensive fiscal adjustments 
were still needed and, furthermore, the adjustments would need to be sustained over 
the medium to long term. Given the importance of the IMF loan to Hungary’s ongoing 
financial recovery, Mr Rosenberg’s comments carried enormous weight for 
international investors.  
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Despite extensive discussions over a two week period, the missions left 
Budapest without reaching an agreement with the Hungarian Government. The IMF 
noted that ‘while there is much common ground, a range of issues remain open. The 
mission will therefore return to Washington, D.C. The IMF will continue to actively 
engage with the authorities with a view to bridging remaining differences’.315 Within 
the context of the disastrous use of the Greek analogy and the clumsy attempts to 
correct the record, the breakdown of talks with the IMF hardened negative perceptions 
about the Orban Government amongst many external observers. Peter Attard 
Montalto, an economist from Nomura, described breakdown of talks as a ‘very rare 
event, countries usually go out of their way to satisfy these missions’.316 Similarly, 
Timothy Ash from the Royal Bank of Scotland observed, ‘it seems the new 
government has not learnt its lessons from the previous gaffe, while the market is in 
no mood to overlook any fiscal laxity’.317 Indeed, the ongoing actions of the 
Hungarian sovereign were outside the norms at play in the modern international 
system.  
The inconclusive outcome of the talks between the IMF, EU and the Orban 
Government further diminished the credibility of Fidesz. The Economist newspaper 
noted that the ramifications triggered by the breakdown could be widespread, 
observing that ‘in a world where a misspoken word by a formerly obscure town 
mayor in a provincial city in eastern Hungary can wipe out trillions in global asset 
values, it is likely the impact of this weekend’s events will make itself felt in 
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emerging markets from Malaysia to Argentina’.318 The Financial Times editorial 
pages declared that ‘Mr Orban should now scramble to recover’ the confidence of 
lenders and warned of the dangers associated with being ‘tempted to flirt with 
indiscipline’.319 The continued erosion of confidence in the new Hungarian 
administration amongst participants in the global financial markets was soon to evolve 
from event-driven observations and market reactions to far more tangible 
consequences for global lenders.  
In July 2010, Moody’s placed Hungary’s local and foreign currency 
government bond rating under review for a possible downgrade.
320
 Moody’s stated 
their decision was triggered by the ‘increased uncertainty regarding Hungary’s fiscal 
outlook’, before specifically highlighting the breakdown in talks between the 
sovereign and the IMF and EU as a concern.
321
 Moody’s also identified Fidesz’s 
proposed bank levy as representing a ‘further potential drag on economic activity as it 
could negatively affect banks’ credit provisioning and the country’s investment 
climate’.322 When describing the factors that would be considered in the review, 
Moody’s highlighted the Orban Government’s ‘ability and willingness … to 
formulate a coherent reform agenda that could stabilize economic strength generally, 
and the government’s financial strength specifically’.323 The prescriptive measures 
were yet another demonstration of the relational, as well as structural power employed 
by credit rating agencies to influence the activities of sovereign actors.  
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The specific reference by Moody’s to the Orban Government’s ‘willingness’ 
to deliver potentially contentious spending restraints brought the domestic Hungarian 
political environment into focus. In the April 2010 Hungarian elections, the far-right 
Jobbik Party had surprised many domestic and international observers when it 
received 15% of the vote to come in third behind Fidesz and the Socialists.
324
 Jobbik 
had taken a decidedly nationalistic tone in the lead up to the elections and were highly 
critical of the IMF/EU rescue package of 2008.
325
 When talks between the Orban 
Government, IMF and EU broke down, the Party was highly critical of the global 
financial markets and their attempt to influence Hungarian decision making. In a 
statement, Jobbik said, ‘we can guess at the choreography that will follow from 
Monday: politicians, analysts and journalists serving the global financial powers will 
lay into the government for not giving into foreign pressure … the discussions with 
the IMF and the EU are a key front in the fight for economic independence’.326 With 
such overt economic nationalism stoking isolationist sentiment on Fidesz’s right 
flank, the Orban Government was under pressure to demonstrate its own ability to 
stand up for Hungarian interests. Dietmar Hornun, a Moody’s Vice President and lead 
analyst for Hungary, clearly factored in such domestic political considerations, 
stating, ‘Moody’s expects the Hungarian government and the EU and IMG to come to 
an agreement following the local elections (scheduled for 3 October)’.327  
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Moody’s had reached the conclusion that the Orban Government would not be 
in a position to agree to the tough measures being advocated by the IMF and EU 
while Fidesz was focused on domestic political considerations. This assessment was 
made in July, some three months before local elections were due. Given the 
tumultuous gyrations on global financial markets over the weeks leading up to the 
Moody’s statement and their potential impact on Hungary’s economy, such an 
assessment reflects a significant judgment of the priorities of Hungarian decision 
makers by a credit rating agency. This assessment also represents a judgement about 
the willingness of Hungarian policy makers to make certain budgetary decisions. 
Determinations about an actor’s willingness to pursue a certain course of action, 
particularly an actor as multifarious as a state actor, ultimately reflect a judgement call 
on the part of credit rating agencies. While economists will typically let the statistics 
guide their judgements, credit rating agencies seeking to make observations about 
state actors are compelled to ascertain something far more nebulous and difficult to 
define – willingness. This potentially pivotal factor takes many forms, as seen by the 
actions of another credit rating agency, namely, Standard and Poor’s.  
On the same day that Moody’s announcement of a review, Standard and 
Poor’s revised its outlook for Hungary’s sovereign credit rating from stable to 
negative.
328
  Like Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s highlighted the collapse of talks with 
the IMF as being an important factor, stating that ‘we believe that without an EU/IMF 
program to anchor policy, Hungary is likely to face high and more volatile funding 
costs, which in our view could weigh on financial sector balance sheets, the public 
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finances and economic growth’.329 Standard and Poor’s was also highly critical of the 
Orban Government’s proposed bank levy, stating, ‘we believe a tax on financial 
system assets at the levels proposed could impeded the function of the financial 
system over the medium term by impairing the banking sector’s ability to raise capital 
and therefore its ability to lend’.330 The profile of political considerations amongst the 
credit rating agencies was reinforced when Standard and Poor’s ominously stated that 
‘we could lower the rating … if the political commitment to pursue growth-supportive 
policies weakens’.331  
While Moody’s referred to ‘willingness’, Standard and Poor’s referred to 
‘political commitment’. Needless to say both rating agencies were referring to the 
same thing. The process for reaching determinations on such a variable is far from 
transparent, nor is it well understood in the modern international system. Yet, beyond 
the definitional clarity of statistics lies an important layer of judgements by the credit 
rating agencies that are highly influential to contemporary global governance.  
The chronology of developments around the Hungarian sovereign’s policy 
making processes and the response by credit rating agencies attests to the totemic role 
political considerations played during 2010. As predicted by Moody’s, the focus of 
the Orban Government between July and early October was the local government 
elections, in which Fidesz performed strongly, winning twenty-two of twenty-three 
races in Hungary’s largest cities.332 Edith Balazs reported on Bloomberg that the 
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results boosted Orban’s grip on power, ‘freeing him of electoral pressures until 
2014’.333 Ms Balasz went on to note that ‘investors are betting the results will give 
Orban, 47, the freedom to unveil the concrete economic policies and budget cuts 
they’ve waited for’.334 Much of the commentary in the financial media following the 
local government elections echoed the sentiments expressed by the credit rating 
agencies in the preceding months. There was an expectation that Fidesz’s political 
commitment, or willingness, to focus on economic and budgetary issues would 
increase once a key event on the domestic political calendar had passed.  
As expected by external observers, the Orban Government quickly moved to 
address concerns about the budget deficit following Fidesz’s strong showing in the 
local government elections. Within days of the results, the Orban Government 
announced a raft of potentially contentious measures designed to boost the Hungarian 
sovereign’s revenues, including most notably a series of ‘crisis taxes’ on the energy, 
retail and telecoms sectors.
335
 Prime Minister Orban told the Hungarian Parliament 
that ‘until we are out of the ditch, it’s only fair that the strongest participants of the 
economy help those who are still in distress’, while acknowledging the measures sent 
‘bad messages’ to international investors.336 The post-local government election 
policy package also contained cuts in government contributions to non-government 
pension plans and cuts in personal taxation rates.
337
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While most international analysts welcomed the measures for increasing the 
likelihood of Hungary meeting its deficit targets, many also voiced concerns about the 
consequences of the ‘crisis taxes’ on business confidence and investment, while 
others questioned the impact of the package on Hungary’s budget. For example, 
Capital Economics also voiced concern at the scale of the revenue measures 
announced by Prime Minister Orban, noting that ‘efforts remain reliant on temporary 
measures and a failure to tackle contingent risks elsewhere in the public sector means 
that the country is still walking a fiscal tightrope’.338 The link between the Orban 
Government’s announcement and future rating agency announcements was also top of 
mind for many in the global financial markets, with widespread speculation on how 
they would react to the measures. Market participants feared the package would fall 
short of expectations, particularly given the downgrade of the outlook for the 
Hungarian sovereign a few months earlier. As Daniel Bebesy from Budapest Fund 
Management had previously told Reuters in the context of mooted reforms; ‘I don’t 
know whether it will be enough to avoid further downgrades to Hungary’s ratings’. 339 
Financial market participants like Mr Bebesy did not need to wait long for a 
response. On 6 December 2010, Moody’s announced it was downgrading Hungary’s 
government bonds by two notches, from Baa3 to Baa1.
340
 Moody’s spokesperson 
Dietmar Hornung announced the downgrade was, ‘primarily driven by the Hungarian 
government’s gradual but significant loss of financial strength, as the government’s 
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strategy relies on temporary measures rather than sustainable fiscal consolidation 
policies. As a result, the country’s structural budget deficit is set to deteriorate’.341 
The future outlook did not auger well for the Hungarian sovereign, with the credit 
rating agency highlighting that ‘Moody’s may again downgrade the ratings if the 
government fails to stabilise its financial strength. The stabilisation of the 
government's financial strength may be complicated by increased risk aversion from 
investors, reflected in exchange-rate pressures or rising financing costs’.342 The 
market reaction to the Moody’s announcement was unambiguous, with the forint 
falling 1%, bond yields jumping by ten basis points and the Hungarian stock market 
falling nearly 1% on the news.
343
 
The political reaction was no less emphatic. Fidesz released a statement on 14 
December entitled ‘Moody’s Downgrade Does Not Matter’, which highlighted 
comments by an analyst in a report in a German newspaper that credit rating agencies 
were becoming ‘less credible’ who ‘always pull the emergency brake when the facts 
are obvious’.344 At a press conference, Prime Minister Orban said that Hungary was 
not planning on responding to the Moody’s downgrade by re-negotiating a deal with 
the IMF, noting it was ‘always better to rely on the money market instead of 
international organisations’.345 Despite their disagreement with the Moody’s decision, 
the Hungarian sovereign appeared unable to disavow the credit rating agency of its 
assessments prior to the announcement. Moody’s, as part of its disclosure obligations, 
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indicated that ‘the rating has been disclosed to the rated entity or its designated agents 
and issued with no amendment resulting from that disclosure’.346 
While the Prime Minister sought to downplay the significance of the Moody’s 
downgrade, he was overseeing the finalisation of the 2011 Budget Act, which was 
subsequently passed by the Hungarian Parliament on 23 December 2010.
347
 The 
Budget contained a number of previously announced measures, designed to bring the 
budget deficit down to 2.94% of GDP.
348
 On the same day, Fitch Ratings downgraded 
Hungary’s long term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) one notch from 
BBB to BBB-. Fitch justified the decision in highly political terms, noting: 
the new Fidesz government, which won a two-thirds majority in parliamentary 
elections in April 2010, has set out fiscal plans that go in the wrong direction 
for further fiscal consolidation. The reversal of pension reforms, populist tax 
measures that fall mainly on foreign banks and companies, changes to the 
independent fiscal council and government moves that appear to interfere with 
the independence of the central bank are concerning signals.
349
  
Again, a credit rating agency referred to judgements that are distinctly interpretative 
when justifying a ratings action. Fitch’s reference to Fidesz’s thumping Parliamentary 
majority was a deliberate attempt to highlight the absence of domestic political 
obstacles for the sorts of measures Fitch saw as optimal to restoring Hungary’s 
creditworthiness.  
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In the period between June and December, Fitch had gone from viewing the 
Hungarian budget deficit targets as ‘moderately encouraging’,350 to concluding that 
the Orban Government’s fiscal plans ‘go in the wrong direction’.351 The description of 
tax measures as populist reveals the rating agency’s concern that Fidesz was still too 
preoccupied by domestic political considerations to make the tough budgetary 
decisions it deemed necessary for fiscal consolidation. Such decisions again revolve 
around assessments of the rationale of policy makers and their willingness to pursue a 
particular policy setting. The timing of the Fitch announcements suggests the credit 
rating agency did not expect anything new to emerge as a result of the Parliamentary 
approval of the 2011 Budget Act. The markets responded in a predictable fashion, 
with the forint falling against the euro while the cost of insuring Hungary’s sovereign 
debt against default rose.
352
 Wall Street Journal journalists Clare Connaghan and 
Veronika Gulyas observed the market reaction was, ‘a sign that investors are 
becoming increasingly concerned about Hungary’s outlook’.353 
The Hungarian sovereign limped into 2011 with its reputation amongst global 
investors badly damaged. The experience of Hungary’s Fidesz Government between 
April and December 2010 attests to what Rosenau termed the ‘intersubjective 
consensus’ at play in the modern international system.354 Indeed, in its first eight 
months, a newly elected government attempted to create knowledge about its own 
finances and its own financial outlook, only to be dismissed out of hand by 
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international institutions like the IMF and EU, global investors, international financial 
media and, importantly, the credit rating agencies. Powerful enforcement mechanisms 
in the form of movements in currency markets, bond yields and equity prices affirmed 
the hierarchy of contemporary global governance. Fidesz’s rapid attempts to correct 
the clumsy Greek comparison affirm the relational power of the global financial 
markets and those who shape their perceptions.  
Amidst a surge of nationalistic sentiment, the Orban Government had clear 
aspirations for a more autarkic Hungary. Indeed, Hungary was by no means the first 
state actor to overtly shun international norms. However, Hungary’s overwhelming 
susceptibility to shifts in sentiment amongst private capital market investors ensured 
that elected policy makers sought to at least partially accommodate the aspirations of 
key external stakeholders by demonstrating some willingness to address identified 
fiscal issues. The rapid recalibration of political attention towards fiscal matters 
following the local government elections in October 2010 directly mirrored the 
predictions made by Moody’s three months earlier. The credit rating agencies have 
clearly become adept at interpreting electoral cycles and how they effect the 
behaviour of elected officials, even in relatively new democracies.  
Assessments by the credit rating agencies on the willingness or political 
commitment of Hungarian politicians played a key role in creating the narrative that 
shaped perceptions within the global financial markets about the new Fidesz 
Government. Despite the myriad of opaque influences that shape decision making by 
domestic politicians, credit rating agencies overtly referenced the intent of elected 
decision makers as being integral to the rating outlook of the Hungarian sovereign. 
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Once conclusions about such matters were reached, elected officials were quickly 
defined by them in the eyes of the global financial markets. In effect, these 
determinations represent Comor’s ‘conceptual systems’ that ‘facilitate particular 
understandings and applications’.355 Such systems also represent the structural power 
bestowed upon occupants at the top of Strange’s knowledge structure.356  
The ratings actions relating to the Hungarian sovereign during 2010 also 
reflected the classic carrot and stick approach that has become so familiar in the 
twenty-first century. In June and July, Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s all 
issued warning cards, placing the Hungarian sovereign on review and publicly stating 
with great clarity their expectations on how policy makers should act. The strictures 
were hard to misinterpret and a clear signal to market participants about what policy 
settings were expected. Such messaging synchronised with the publicly acknowledged 
assessments of participants in the financial markets. This signalling increased the 
pressure on the Hungarian sovereign, which hardened its commitment to fiscal 
consolidation over the course of 2010. In their mid-year statements, the credit rating 
agencies clearly enunciated how the sovereign could avoid future rating downgrades, 
while ominously sounding warning bells. True to their word, all three major credit 
rating agencies withheld judgement until the October 2010 local government elections 
had been completed and when political considerations were expected to ebb away 
amongst Hungarian decision makers. By December, their patience had run out, and 
overt enforcement mechanisms were deployed in the form of rating downgrades and 
the resulting market reactions.  
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The Hungarian experience from 2010 provides scholars with a powerful 
demonstration of the calibration of the contemporary knowledge hierarchy and the 
subordinated role of state actors within the modern international system. The 
inherently international nature of that system necessitates conceptual systems that 
provide unambiguous, globally recognised standards against which actors can be 
assessed. Even when states seek to directly shape perceptions about their own 
financial position, they are trumped by the intersubjective consensus at play amongst 
recognised knowledge generators. While many actors play a role in generating this 
consensus, including market participants and observers, the global financial media 
and international institutions like the IMF, it is the credit rating agencies that 
explicitly communicate expectations to states and leverage their ability to influence a 
country’s credit rating to influence behaviour. This communication is often very 
public, accentuating its impact on the broader market consensus.  
While EU member states have a particularly strong susceptibility to the 
assessments of credit rating agencies, other large, ostensibly powerful state actors 
contort their decision making processes to pacify the credit rating agencies. The 
prominence of assessments about a sovereign’s intentions attests to the importance of 
subjective judgements about policy makers by the credit rating agencies. How these 
organisations make such judgements remains opaque, to the detriment of a greater 
understanding of contemporary global governance. State actors, once dominant 
players in the international system, now find themselves confined to tightened 
straightjackets, with little room for error. The costs associated with erring from 
globally accepted norms are significant and administered swiftly by the global 
financial markets. Not only do state actors need to adhere to an entrenched and 
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powerful set of norms, they must seek to demonstrate their intent to continue to do so 
into the future. In reality, sovereign decision makers have remarkably little room to 
manoeuvre in the modern international system, significantly impacting human affairs 
on a global scale.  
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Conclusion: Understanding the Current 
The nature, scale and complexity of the modern international system has 
outgrown the state-based order and replaced it with something less tangible, but more 
dynamic and more impactful. Human affairs are no longer regulated on a worldwide 
basis exclusively by state actors and their associated organisations. Rather, credit 
rating agencies play a pivotal role in determining global governance in the twenty-
first century. While their role is gaining increasing recognition amongst IPE scholars, 
a greater understanding of how credit rating agencies acquire and exercise authority 
will reward observers of the modern international system with an enhanced 
comprehension of how that system operates.  
The credit rating agencies’ ability to craft a pervasive cognitive centralisation 
amongst a broad range of actors in the international system has been carefully 
cultivated over decades of rating activity. This cognitive centralisation is reinforced 
by swift, efficacious enforcement mechanisms driven by the global financial markets, 
whose role has become elevated in tandem with the extraordinary growth in the usage 
of credit and knowledge in the modern international system. A powerful current 
shapes contemporary global governance. State and not-state actors alike can rise or 
fall on the assessments made by the credit rating agencies and the associated response 
from the global financial markets. How these assessments are made and 
communicated lies at the very heart of contemporary global governance. Yet such 
assessments are, as described by Sinclair, ‘manifestly political’ and inherently 
subjective.
357
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The case studies explored in this thesis demonstrate that relatively indefinable 
factors such as political commitment and willingness were central to the assessments 
made by credit rating agencies about the creditworthiness of two European state 
actors. Often, these conclusions were reached by the credit rating agencies in direct 
contradiction to the views held by key decision makers from the rated sovereigns, the 
very people whose political commitment or willingness was being assessed. To make 
such distinctions, the credit rating agencies must be in a position to distil messaging 
from decision makers and make judgements in the context of political, economic and 
international considerations. Standard and Poor’s criteria for sovereign credit risk 
assessments highlight that overarching factors like stability and predictability are 
primary considerations used when assigning a political score to a rated state actor. In 
the absence of such attributes, the judgements made by credit rating agencies relating 
to state actors are particularly influential in crafting the views and ultimately the 
decisions of financial market participants.  
A unique confluence of events has assisted the credit rating agencies assume 
their authoritative role in the contemporary global order. The growth in the 
importance of credit in the contemporary global system, the associated increase in the 
scale of the global financial system, the interconnectedness of that system across state 
borders, disintermediation, longer intermediation chains and the indubitable demand 
for globally recognised knowledge related to creditworthiness, have combined to 
empower credit rating agencies and neuter the ability of other actors to shape human 
affairs. Amidst extraordinary growth in the volume and availability of information, 
credit rating agencies have exploited a first mover advantage and have been able to 
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provide globally recognised and consistent knowledge structures that deliver much 
needed parameters around which investors can make decisions.  
This unique capability is backed by a myriad of enforcement mechanisms, 
including market reactions that synchronise with announcements by credit rating 
agencies. Of particular relevance are the examples outlined in this thesis of the 
supremacy of determinations by credit rating agencies over announcements of states 
and corporations. As seen with frequency in the modern international system, 
participants in the financial markets ultimately prioritised the assessments made by 
credit rating agencies, even when those assessments directly contradicted 
announcements and messaging being generated by the rated entity. In the Hungarian 
case study, the market reaction to comments deemed outside the acceptable paradigm 
saw sovereign decision makers scramble to correct their mistake, providing a 
powerful example of the relational power capabilities of the intersubjective consensus 
that Rosenau has argued so assiduously pervades contemporary global governance.    
The historic importance of state actors in global governance makes their 
relationship with credit rating agencies a highly relevant intersection of the competing 
interests that craft the modern international system. This intersection sheds light on 
how credit rating agencies develop knowledge relating to state actors and use that 
knowledge to directly and indirectly influence their behaviour. It also reveals the 
subordinated role of state actors in the knowledge generation process. In an era when 
gyrations on the global financial markets can trigger massive political and policy 
changes in developed and developing states with extraordinary speed, those who 
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shape the conceptual systems that anchor such decision making sit atop the 
knowledge hierarchy.  
The composition of the modern knowledge hierarchy was on graphic display 
in Ireland during 2010. The Irish experience of 2010 provides scholars with a 
powerful example of the impotence of state actors once the intersubjective consensus 
shifts. Irish decision makers, through direct interaction with bond investors and the 
credit rating agencies, sought to shape perceptions about the creditworthiness of the 
Irish sovereign. After expressing confidence in that process in April of that year, 
Ireland was rocked by seven negative rating actions by the credit rating agencies 
between July and December 2010. Despite overt protestations by Irish decision 
makers, this example displayed the futility of attempting to swim against the current 
in the modern international system.  
The Irish case study also demonstrates how quickly that consensus can shift 
and the leading role credit rating agencies play in shaping the consensus through 
cognitive centralisation. This overt display of structural power was reinforced by a 
similarly identifiable display of relational power, when the governing Fianna Fail 
Party implemented harsh budgetary measures as prescribed the credit rating agencies, 
even though the Government was at the end of the Irish electoral cycle and due to face 
imminent elections. The predictable election loss represented a palpable 
demonstration of the political consequences that can be associated with negative 
credit rating actions.  
The Hungarian experience in the same year illustrates the synchronicity at play 
between observers and participants in the global financial system and the credit rating 
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agencies. Hungary represents a particularly relevant case study because of the 
sovereigns’ sensitivity to market responses goes beyond that of many other European 
states. Hungary’s reliance on private capital investment is accentuated by the fact that 
its bank lending is primarily denominated in foreign currency. This reliance was 
highly visible during that tumultuous year. The response from a range of global actors 
was unanimously negative when, in June 2010, decision makers from a new Fidesz 
Government significantly erred outside the acceptable norms when Hungary’s debt 
crisis was compared to that of Greece. The failure of the talks between the Hungarian 
Government, the IMF and the EU was also atypical and interpreted as a damaging 
sign of inexperience, instability and a lack of political commitment to adhere to the 
preferred policy setting.  
The modern intersubjective consensus offers very little room for error, 
particularly given the speed at which comments uttered in one state can quickly 
reverberate around the globe and impact the price movements of various financial 
instruments. The rapid response by Fidesz decision makers represented a 
demonstration of the sensitivity of many state actors to the powerful enforcement 
mechanisms at play in contemporary global governance. The chorus of criticism and 
the tangible negative response of global financial markets left this state actor with 
little choice but to fall into line and downplay any link with the Greek situation. In 
contemporary global governance, perceived sedition can be punished with 
extraordinary speed.  
The Hungarian experience of 2010 also provides evidence of how critical 
domestic political considerations are when credit rating agencies assess the 
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willingness of state actors to implement explicitly prescribed policy settings. In July 
2010, credit rating agencies clearly communicated their anticipation that the Orban 
Government would be not focus on budgetary issues until the conclusion of local 
government elections, which were due in October. The accuracy of such predictions 
regarding the behaviour of state decision makers attests to the focus credit rating 
agencies place on these assessments as part of their remit to determine the 
creditworthiness of state actors.  
To accommodate their predictions on such matters, the credit rating agencies 
are continuing to broaden their offering beyond rating actions to incorporate 
opportunities for predictive analysis such as credit watches and outlooks. Such 
offerings help shape the perceptions of many global financial market participants 
relating to more amorphous qualities of a sovereign’s creditworthiness such as the 
current and future willingness of key decision makers to implement particular policy 
measures. Indeed, a cognitive centralisation is being applied about the intentions of 
sovereign decision makers, not just the decisions they make. This development has 
profound consequences for contemporary global governance. State actors seeking to 
pacify knowledge generators must seek to demonstrate a preparedness to pursue 
certain courses of action in the future, not just demonstrate an ability to deliver the 
prescribed policy settings in the present.  
For credit rating agencies, speculation on such matters helps generate 
additional demand for the knowledge they provide. By broadening their offering well 
beyond simple rating scores, credit rating agencies have strengthened their place atop 
the knowledge hierarchy and deepened the current that shapes contemporary global 
 166 
governance. These assessments are subjective, inherently political and ultimately 
represent judgement calls by organisations who have observed thousands of sovereign 
decision makers around the globe. These assessments also lend themselves to 
judgements on personalities and character traits. The perception that the Orban 
Government was dominated by bombastic, nationalist and aggressive decision makers 
clearly shaped how developments such as the breakdown in talks with the IMF and 
EU were interpreted by the credit rating agencies and the global financial markets.  
The case studies explored in this thesis demonstrate that the decisions reached 
by credit agencies about intentions can often contravene the messages communicated 
by the decision makers whose intentions are being assessed. Such conflicting 
perspectives at the intersection between state actors and credit rating agencies could 
create opacity, if not for the clarity of the modern knowledge hierarchy. Assessments 
around intentions and willingness are a far cry from assessments relating to economic 
or budgetary data. For many participants in the global financial markets, a sovereigns’ 
intentions are best assessed by a credit rating agency, rather than the sovereign itself.  
The modern international system lends itself to authority being transferred to 
those global actors who can claim an ability to apply consistent benchmarks around 
the multifarious factors that shape creditworthiness. State actors lack the perceived 
objectivity to be taken as seriously as those who rate state actors on a global scale. 
This standing weakens the ability of sovereign decision makers to shape external 
perceptions around their intentions and actions. Despite the 2008 global financial 
crisis and the subsequent development of Basel III, the knowledge hierarchy sits intact 
within an immovable intersubjective consensus.  
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The current that shapes contemporary global governance remains too strong, 
too deep and too broad for state actors to resist. Any efforts to swim their own course 
will be unsuccessful. Backed by powerful enforcement mechanisms that deliver 
unprecedented rapid responses on a global scale, the cognitive centralisation at play in 
the modern international system continues to adapt to changing economic and 
political times. The judgements made by credit rating agencies craft cotemporary 
global governance, placing enormous importance to their assessment processes. This 
thesis has sought to shed light on these processes to enhance our understanding of 
how human affairs are regulated in the twenty-first century.  
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